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I. INTRODUCTION
In which settings might individuals lose constitutional rights
innocently, that is through no conduct on their part (direct, indirect as
through agents, or apparent)? Are any sue� settings differentiated by the
type of relevant constit11tional right, as between a civil and criminal jury
trial? As between differing constitutional criminal procedure rights, like
confrontation and jury trial? As between substantive rights, Like free
Profc sor Emeritus. Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby
College; J.D., The University of chicago. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
Eleventh Constitutional Law colloquium held in November, 2020 at Loyola University of
Chicago Law School.
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speech, and procedural rights, like confrontation? As between an
enumerated substantive constitutional right, like free speech, and an
unenumerated fundamental constitutional right, like privacy? As between
differing types of enumerated and somewhat comparable constitutional
rights, like free speech and free assembly? As between differing types of
unenumerated substantive rights, like abortion and parental childcare? As
between somewhat comparable fundamental and nonfundamental rights,
like the fundamental right to "just compensation" for "private property"
"taken for public use" by government and the nonfundamental right to
compensation for private property lost by government for no good
reason? 1 Or, as between otherwise comparable constitutional rights in the
U.S. and some American state constitutions, as with certain privacy and
search and seizure rights?
Some individuals innocently lose constitutional rights, both
substantive and procedural, both enumerated and unenumerated, both
fundamental and nonfundamental. One can also innocently lose nonconstitutional rights. Innocent losses occur when individuals lose rights
though they have not acted in any way to prompt such losse as by acting
through direct or implicit waivers,2 in apparent ways, or through agents. 3
Findings of compelling state interests, rationality, or other sufficient
government justifications do not accompany innocent losses.

Concededly, there arc sometimes difficulties in line-drawing between governmental
property deprivations involvin g fundamenta l and nonfunda mcntal righ1.s . Yet, eminent domain
ca c involving real property takings arc clearly processed differently than property losses
arising from injuries suffered in prison. Compare Knick v. Township ofSeott, Pennsylvania,
139 S. Ct. 2162, 2177 (2019) (determining that property owner has a federal constitutional
claim for governmental taking of the property for public use which can be pursued at the time
of the taking without first pursuing unsuccessfully an initial state law claim for just
compensation) and United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. I 4, 19 ( 1970) (requiring, per what is
now Pcdcral of Civil Procedure 7 l(h)(l )(B), a jury trial on issue of amount of compensation),
with Parratt et al. v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981) (considering the administrative
process), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (finding no due process
deprivation if injuries caused by a prison officer's mere lack of care) and Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984) (subjecting, too, unauthorized intentional property deprivation by
prison guard to post-deprivation administrative process).
2
The notion of consent is fraught with difficulties. See Michelle Tomkovicz,
Comment, ff You 're Reading This, It 's Too Late: The Unconstitutionality of Notice
Effectuating Implied Consent, 70 EMORY L.J. 153, 160-63 (2020) (exploring the meaning of
consent through a philosophical lens in order to understand permutations of consent in
different areas oflaw, including contract, sexual assault, and search laws).
3
See discussion related to innocent losses within the context of parent-child
relationships infra Section II F.
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Innocent losses occur under a variety of doctrines, including
"common authority," "presumed consent," quasi-contract, and agency. 4
Sometimes innocent losses are largely foreclosed, as by the bar on the
"unilateral acts" by others to prompt losses of personal jurisdiction
defenses for nonresident civil defendants 5 or on the inability of a criminal
defense lawyer to waive an accused's right to jury trial. 6
This Article begins by demonstrating how the courts have sanctioned
innocent losses of varying rights. 7 It reviews, by way of example, the
common authority doctrine in Fourth Amendment search cases; the
presumed consent doctrine in intentional tort cases involving
infringements on bodily integrity; the quasi-contract doctrine in property
cases; lawyer agency in both jury trial and nonjury trial right cases; de
facto parentage cases; childcare opportunities for genetic donors in formal
adoption cases; and childcare opportunities in Safe Haven cases. 8 This
Article posits that the rationales supporting innocent losses of
constitutional rights are often weak, especially when the losses involve
fundamental rights. 9 It ends by urging that innocent losses of all rights
should be mitigated, illustrated by a focus on losses of constitutional
childcare rights. 10
II. INNOCENT LOSSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A. Common Authority in Search Cases
Federal constitutional privacy interests involving governmental
searches can be lost through earlier consent. Often, the one whose body
or property authorities seek to search is the one who undertakes consent. 11
See discussion infra Sections II A, B, C, and D respectively.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) ("But the
mere 'unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant
cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State."') (quoting Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
6
FED. R. CRIM. P.11 (acknowledging that, before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, "the court must address the defendant personally in open court[] ... and
determine that the defendant understands[] ... the right to a jury trial.").
7
See infra Part II.
See infra Sections II A-H respectively.
See infra Part IV.
10
See infra Part IV.
11
While consent may seemingly be given, nevertheless it may be involuntary under
certain circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 664 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 2012)
(noting that circumstances include "(1) whether defendant was in custody; (2) whether the
arresting officers have their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings have been given; (4)
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At times, as with a post-conviction criminal probationer or parolee,
individuals can give such consent in advance. 12 As well, one person
imbued with actual or implied authority may consent on behalf of another
person. 13
Yet, one occupant consenting to a governmental search of physical
premises whose occupancy is shared by two people with similar pdvacy
interests can effectively negate a non-consenting co-occupant' privacy
interest in, and Fourth Amendment objection to a earch. 14 In 2004 the
U.S. Supreme Court in Fernandez v. California, recognized that effective
consent to a premises search by one occupant impacted another
occupant' Fourth Amendment privacy interests in the premises where the
Latter occupant did not con ent. 15 There Walter Fernandez told police
officers who had come to his apartment, which Ro anne Rojas also
occupied at the time, that they did not "bave any right to come in." 16
Shortly thereafter, the police arrested Fernandez at the apartment for
attacking both Rojas and Abel Lopez, whose attack in the neighborhood
whether the defendant was told he has a right not to consent; and (5) whether defendant was
told a search warrant could be obtained.").
12
See McElroy v. State, 133 N.E.3d 201, 206 (Ind. App. 2019) ("Our Supreme Court
has specifically recognized an xccption to tho warrant rcq11ircmcn( in a search of the
residence of a probationer or community corrections parlicipanl where the probat ioncr or
participant has in advance, by valid consent or term in conditions of release, authorized a
warranllcss, uspicionlcss search."); United States v. Caya, 956 F.3d 498, 503 (7th ir. 2020)
(co11sidcring within the context ofposL-imprisonmcnt ''extended supervisi n '). Condition can
be attached 10 such conscnl thus limiting governmental authority. See tatc v. Humm, 5 9
S.W.3d 765, 773- 77 (Tenn. 20 19 (reviewing cases nationwide regarding whether reasonable
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing is necessary to support a search of a probationer and finding
that no such suspicion is needed).
13
But see U.S. v. Moran, 944 F.3d I, 3 (1st Cir. 2019) (determining that a sister had
no actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of her brother's garbage bags stored in
the sislcr' Storage unit).
1•
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that while a criminally accu ·ed n eds to
waive personally, via a knowing volun tary and intelligent decision, constilulional rights
promoting a fair trial, a waiver of the constitutional right involving a governmental search or
sci.z urc can be undertaken differently, and with lesser protections since Fourth Amendment
rights arc not indispensable to obtaining a fair trial. See Schneckloth v . .Bustamontc, 412 U.S.
218, 238, 241 ( 1973). hared property interests beyond living quarters inhabited by
roommatcs/eotcnan1s/spouscs may not always yield common authority. See Slate v. Dinkins,
2019 WL 231460 I al •3 (N.J. uper. App. May 31, 20 I 9){holding that a car rental company
cannot consent to search of car rented by A though solely driven by B, where B was the target
of the search). or course, additional constitutional privacy protections of those subject to
governmental searches can arise under state constitutions. Sec Hill v. Nat' ! Collegiate A1hletic
Ass ' n, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994) (applying Privacy Initiative of California state
constitution to nongovernmental searches).
15
Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 294 (2014).
16
Id. at 296-97 .
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prompted the visit to the apartment. 17 About an hour later, the arre ting
detective returned to the apartrnent. 18 Rojas then gave 'oral and written
consent'' to a search of some part of the apaitment. 19 The earch uncovered
evidence u ed to convict Fernandez, wbo had sought evidence
suppression on Fourth Amendment grounds. 20
The Court sustained tbe search, determining tbat 'a person who
hares a residence with other assumes the risk that 'any one of them may
admit visitorsO .... "'21 At time , courts exp Iicitly tie such an assumption
of risk to a reduced expectation of privacy and/or an intent to forego
privacy interests. 22
The Court in Fernandez ctid recognize that any consent to search by
Roja would not bind Fernandez if he was present at the apartment and
objected. 23 Yet, as Rojas was the sole, present occupant of the apartment

Id. at 295-96.
Id. at 296.
19
Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 296. Where consents aro 1101 truly voluntary evidence
obtained during the search will be barred from trial under the Fourth Amendment. See PaganGonza lez v. Morono, 919 F.3d 582, 590 (I st Cir.2019) (holding lhat oflicers ' deception
vitiates voluntariness of consent to search). On promoting more truly voluntary consents to
searches, see, for example, Susan A. Bnndcs, Police Acco1111tabifity and the Problem of
Regulating Con ent Searches, 20 I U. lLL. L. REV. 1759 (2018).
lO
Femandez, 571 U.S. al 297. Had the search been undertaken by a tribal officer that
involved property on a reservation. likely there would be a similar bar. ee generally United
States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing how tbc Indian Civil Rights Act,
the Fourth Amendment counterpart, operates).
21
Femandez, 571 U.S. at 30 I (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. I 03, 111 (2006));
see also United tatcs v. Matlock 4 15 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974 (discussing·assumption of
risk); United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir. 1994) (employing Matlock, 4 15
U.S. at 171 n.7). The assumption ofri k analysis has also been used 10 validate governmental
access lo much (e.g. cell site location infom,ation), but not all, ofan individua.l' s digital
records held by third parties (like phone companies). For a criticism of I his third-party
doctrine in Fourth Amondmcnl cases, see generally Laura K. Donohue, Functional
17

18

E'q1.d11ale11ce and Residual Rights Post-Carpemer: Framing a Test Co11sistel1f with Precedenl
and Original Meaning, 2018 Sur. T. REV . 347 (20 19). otc that some who live in residences

may not be deemed to hare, under Fernandez, those residences, and thus may be ubjcct to
searches in the residences on 1hc consent of tho resident owner, and be unable to consent io 11
search of the resident owner's belongings in the residence. Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC,
978 F.3d 507, 514, 5 16 (7th Cir. 2020). Even one wbo docs not share a residence may consent
to a warrantl~ search of the residence where the fruits of 1hc search arc admissible as
evidence, a long as there was apparent authority to consent. See e.g., Moore v. Andrcno, 505
P.3d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 2007)· United States v. Sanchez, 608 F.3d 685, 689 (10th ir. 20 I0).
22
See, e.g., United States v. Shelton, 337 F.3d 529, 535 {5th Cir. 2003) (describing a
third-party consent to search a shared residence to involve "a voluntary willingness lo forgo
. . . privacy," including extending capacity to give consent to searches to a lhird party with a
privacy intcrc t who " ha already substantially ceded his expectation ofprivaey.'').
23
Fernandez 571 U.S. at 301 (citing Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122-23).
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when the police sought the later coosent,24 the Court found that
recognizing her consent as binding upon all. occupants would respect her
"right ' and " her independence. '25
"Common authority' between Fernandez and Rojas over the
apartment allowed Rojas to consent to a police earch while Fernandez
was away, even if Fernandez wa only away because of a police atTest and
even if Fernandez had earlier refus~d to consent to a search. 26 According
to the court, those described alternately as "occupant[s]," "resident[s],"
and "tenant[s]" shared common authority. 27 In earlier precedents, courts
found that shared authority over premises arises when two people possess
"common authority over or other sufficientTelationsbip to the premise or
effect ought to be iospected."28 One such precedent concluded: " [t]his
24
The validity of home searches to which the likes of Roxanne Rojas consented when
the likes of Walter Fernandez are not present at home at the time of the consent can be
challenged due to ii.legal police detention of the likes of Walter. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at
121-22; Fernandez, 57 1 U.. al 302; see also talc v. Coles 95 A.3d 136, 139, 146, 151 (N.J .
2014) (noting that all judges, including the di ·scntcr, agreed that a third parly docs not validly
consent by third party when a criminal defendant' ab once from home was caused by police
who wi hcd lo a oid a likely objection): id. at 151 (Pa tterson . J.. dissenting).
25
Femandei:., 57 1 U.S. at 307. ·or Rojas, a warrant less search pursuant to only her
consent would also avoid a "delay" caused by fhc time necessary to obtain a warrant · di pcl
more quickly police "suspicion" regarding her pos iblc role in the crimes commillcd by
Fernandez; and allow speedy police removal of any "dangcrou contraband" fou nd in lhc
residence. Id. (in ternal cillllions omiltcd). A singular factor may not be suflicicnl lo ·ustain a
"common authority" search. See. e.g., Uni ted 1atcs v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 555 (D.C. ir.
2014). At times, at least for me ·•common authori ty" cases arc difficult to distinguish from
"apparent authority" cases. ompare United talcs v. Amraticl, 622 F.3d 914, 916- 17 (Slh
ir. 20 I0), wilh United States v. milh, 2011 W L 2982309, al • 2-3 (D. Neb. July 22, 201 1)
(recognizing II mistake in law that landlord bad apparent authority lo con cnt to carch of
tenant's home); see also United .tatcs v. Murray, 82 l F.3d 386, 39 1-92 (3d Cir. 20 I 6)
("When an ind ividual posscssc only apparent, rather than actual , common authority, the
Fourth Amendment is not violated iflhc police officer's entry is based up n the consent ofa
third party whom the police, al the time of entry, reasonably believe to pos css com mon
authority over the premise , bu1 who in fact docs not do so."') (quoti ng lllinoi v. Rodriguez,
497 U. . 177, 179, 188- 90 (1990)); United States v. Jack on 598 F.3d 340, 348-49 (7th Cir.
2010) (considering a mother's apparent authority to consent 10 search of her adu lt chi ld's
computer).
26
Perhaps as well, the apparent consent by Rojas would have also justified the
warrantlcss search. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990).
27
Fema11dez 571 U.S. at 294, n..l (''W use the terms ' occupant,' 'resident,' and
'tenant' interchangeably 10 refer to persons having 'common authority ' over premises within
the meaning of Ma1/ock .") (citing Uni ted talcs v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 ( 1974)).
28
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 ; see also id. at 171 n.7 ("[M.]utual u c of propc1iy by
persons generally havi ng joint access or control for most purposes," with assumptions of risk
that another " might pcm1it the common area to be searched."); United Stutes v. awycr, 929
F.3d 497, 500 (7Lh Cir. 20 19) (determining that co-owner of empty rental property, who had
"common control," could agrco lo search ofa backpack brought into the property by a
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notion of 'common authority' over the object of the search does not rest
solely on abstract principles of property, but rather stems from a practical
understanding of the way in which the parties to a given relationship have
access to and share certain property."29
Courts have employed the common authority approach to justify
searches of other forms of property, including a re idential home, 30 a

trespasser). Compare State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 251- 54 (Minn. 2003) (finding that a
landlord could nol consent to search of a criminal defendant' rented storage locker, as there
was no "mutual use" of the locker even if there was joint access), with United States v.
Waller, 426 F.3d 83 , 844, 846 (6th ir. 2005) (determining U1at a luggage owner reta ined
sufficient expectation of privacy for bag stored in an apartment resident s bedroom closet, and
there was no "common authority" with the resident for the bag).
29
United States v. McA!pine, 919 F.2d 1461, 1463 (10th Cir. 1990); see also United
States v. Corral, 339 F. Supp. 2d 781, 791 (W.D. Tex. 2004) ("[K]ey to establishing the
common authority required" for third party consent to warrantlcss searches is "mutual use
joint access or control, or some other meaningful connection to the property."). As long as the
police had not requested Roxanne to carch Walter's belonging in their shared apartment,
seemingly her search of his things, even if ccrclcd away, and her transmission of what she
found to police could be employed in a later prosecution of Walter as here there was no
governmental search. See United States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d I, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2020)
(considering a wife's search of her husband ' cellphone).
lO
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 4 6-88 (1971) (considering where
a spouse volunteered guns and clothing of her husband); United States v. Jones, 861 F.3d 638,
639-40 (7th Cir. 2017) (considering where the girl friend of a criminal defendant con ented to
a search of the mobile home she shared with him). There can be portion ofa residential home
or apartment which arc not shared, and thus may not be searched because "common authority"
over those portions is not shared. See United Stales v. Wright, 63 F. Supp. )d l 09 125
(D.D.C. 2014) (determining that a search of criminal defendant' s backpack and attached bag
found in his son's room in an apartment the defendant shared with his mother was lawful as
the mother, the child's guardian, consented); United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 554--55
(D.C. ir.2014) (finding that a criminal defendant's grcal-grondmothcr, with whom
defendant shared an apartm nt, could not con cnt to police search of defcndani's hocbox
which was defendant 's "personal property" and was stored in an area of the apartment where
there was only the defendant's property).
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computer hard drive, 31 a car, 32 a duffel bag, 33 and a gun safe. 34 Common
authority justifications for property searches under Fernandez, however,
cannot reach searches extending beyond reasonable limits 35 or searches
deemed unreasonable under more protective state laws, as with state
constitutional privacy protections. 36
B. Presumed Consent in Intentional Tort Cases
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) on Intentional
Torts, Tentative Draft No. 4 (2019) (hereinafter, the "ALI Torts Draft No.
4") generally recognizes that an actor should not be liable to another for
otherwise tortious intentional conduct37 if the other person "gives legally
effective consent to that conduct."38 Categories of effective consent
31
See pre- and post-Fernandez cases, including, for example, United States v. King,
604 F.3d 125, 137 (3rd Cir. 2010) (holding that a computer owner could consent to seizure of
her computer containing a defendant's hard drive where she and the defendant shared the
computer "without any password protection"); United States v. Thomas, 818 F.3d 1230,
1241--42 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding that a defendant and his wife, who consented to a forensic
search of a shared computer, maintained no separate login name and password, and the
defendant did not encrypt his files); United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F .3d 954, 960 (8th Cir.
2008) (considering where a wife consented to home computer search though husband had
refused to consent and had been arrested at work, and finding that the police were not required
to inform wife of husband's refusal); United States v. Burke, 2009 WL 173829, at *5 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 23, 2009) (contemplating the search of a computer in a wife's home where the
husband did not live, which produced the husband's stored information on a computer that
was not password protected).
32
See United States v. Scott, 732 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that
defendant's on-and-off girlfriend had common authority over defendant's car and therefore ha
dauthority to consent to a search of the car).
33
See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1986) (holding that cousin of petitioner had
authority to consent to search of duffel bag jointly used with petitioner).
34
See United States v. Amraticl, 622 F.3d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 2010).
35
See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 554 (finding no reasonable search of a shoebox in which a
cotenant said contained the suspect's "personal property"). But see United States v. MoorcBush, 963 F.3d 29, 32, 34 (1st Cir. 2020) (exemplif~ing the limits and specifically discussing
that a search involving an eight-month video log of a criminal defendant's house, specifically
driveway and front door, did not violate a defendant's "reasonable expectation of privacy.").
36
State v. Coles, 95 A.3d 136, 151 (N.J. 2014) (employing an objectively reasonable
search norm under N.J. Const., Art. I, 1 7).
37
On intent by a tortfeasor, the ALI generally suggests, at least for the tort of battery,
that a tort is intended where the actor intends to cause "a contact" with another, or where the
actor's intent constitutes "transferred intent." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019).
"[T]ransfcrred intent" is defined as under § 11 and is not yet available. See id.
38
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS§ 12 (Am.
Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019). Certain consent, then, may not be "legally effective."
Consider, for example, where the law prohibits certain consents. See, e.g., Smith v. Calvary
Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590, 595 (Mich. 2000) (acknowledging the "difficult question"
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include actual consent, 39 apparent con ent,40 and presumed consent. 41
"Presumed consent" encompasses intentjonal act by an actor who ' is
justified in engaging" in the acts without the 'actual consent' or the
'apparent consent" of the person acted upon. 42 Thus, the presumed
con ent by a harmed individual where an otherwi e intentional tortfeasor
commit the harrnfu I act does not depend upon the banned person acts.
At times, the banned individual need not act in order for an intentional
tortfeasor to be free from any liability. Any law fo llowing the ALI Tort
Draft No. 4 generally would sanction innocent Losses of rights, including
nonfundamental, constitutionally protected liberty interests. 113 Such a law
would usually only be subject to rational basjs scnitioy.44

where a consent to the infliction of future harm involves conduct "in violation of the Michigan
Penal Code."); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77n ("Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.").
J9
"Actual consent" encompasses consent to conduct where a person is "willing for
that conduct to occur," with willingness either "express or .. . inferred from the facts," as long
as the conduct "is not substantially different in nature from the conduct that the person is
willing to permit." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS§§
I 3(a), 14(a) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019). Actual consent by a principal to
an agent's intentional tort can involve a principal who earlier directed the relevant action or
who later ratified the action. See Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 284 (Ill. 2004)
(reviewing a client's liability for lawyer's intentional tort).
40
"Apparent consent" encompasses intentional acts undertaken with a reasonable
belief that the person acted upon, due to his/her conduct, "actually consents to the conduct."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS : INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS§§ 12(b), l6(a) (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019).
41
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS§ 12(c) (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019).
42
RESTAT MEN (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS§ 16(b) (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019).
43
Innocent lossc could occur at the hands of govcmmcntal officers, employees, and
the like. They cou ld also be ca used by private actors whose conducl is deemed " under color of
state law" under the fift h and Fourteenth Amcndmcnls. See Rawson v. Recovery Innovations,
Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 751, 75 1 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2020) (determining that a private hospital and its
employee acted under color of state law per the " public function" test); Harper v.
Professional Probation Services, Inc., 976 F.3d 1236 1244 ( 1 llh ir. 2020) (findi ng Lhal a
private probation e mpany acfcd in quasi-judicial capacity in overseeing probationers and
thus needed to act with due process impartiality). The "incoherence of the state action
doctrine" in cases involving "private infringements of constitutional rights" is well reviewed
in Erwin Chemerinsky's Rethinking State Action. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinkking Stale
AClion, 80 NW. L. REV . 503 505, 507 (1985); see also Louis Micbacl Seidman, State Action
and the Constitution's Middle Band, 117 MICH. L. REV. I, 4 (2018) (suggesting three
"domains" for state action doctrine).
44
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 728 ( 1997) (rega rding due process);
Price v. Tanner, 855 F.2d 820, 823 (11 th Cir. 198 ) (regarding equal protection); see also
Arbino v. John on & Johnson, 880 N.B.2d 420, 432, 444--43 (Ohio 2007) (findi ng no due
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The ALI Draft, however, does not contemplate significant numbers
of innocent losses for those who are unable to pursue intentional torts due
to presumed consent. Thus, in its Comment, the ALI Draft declares:
[U]nder presumed consent, an actor ordinarily will only be justified in engaging
in conduct in the absence of the other person's actual consent if that conduct is
a minor invasion ofthe interests of the other. Illustrations 6 through 10 all satisfy
this condition. For major invasions of the other's rights, the actor will normally
be subject to liability unless the actor can prove that he or she satisfies an
applicable privilege such as self-defense or defense ofproperty. 45

A tap on the shoulder and a handhold on the third date exemplify
minor invasions of protected liberty interests. 46
Further, not all major, as contrasted with minor, liberty invasions
prompt liability and thus involve governmental sanction of more
significant innocent losses of property. Exceptional cases per the ALI
Draft, where individuals may be exempt from liability for more significant
losses, include emergency circumstances, as well as "medical-treatment
cases" where courts should sometimes be "deferential toward medical
practitioners when the question of exceeding the scope of consent
arises. " 47
C. Quasi-Contract

The American Law Institute (ALI) recognizes in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts some contractual obligations for those who have
not consented in any apparent way. 48 One Restatement provision notes
process or equal protection violation wilh Ohio su11utc limiting noneconomic damages in
certain tort actions for all but the most crious injuries)'; Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 42
A.2d 125, 13Cr37 (N.J . 2004) (finding no due proccs or equal protection violation involving
a statutory bar on an uninsured driver's recovery of noneconomic damages).
45
RESTATEMENT(THtRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO p ·R ONS § 16 cml. d,
illus. 6- 1l (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019) (including, through lllustrutions 610, a lap on the shoulder; a pat on the bultocks of a basketball tcammatc: placing a blanket
over one who i shivering white sleeping; tocking a door to provide safety; and a handhold on
a third date).
46
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 16 cmt. d,
illus. 6, 10 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019)
41
Jd. § 16 cmt. c, reporter's notes.
48
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRA rs§ 4 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981 ); see,
e.g., UCP Biosciences, Inc. v. Am. Screening, LLC, ct al., 2020 WL 4569469, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 6, 2020) (permitting no quasi-contract claim where there exists '"a valid express
contract covering lhe nmc subject'") (quoting Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Rep.
Indemnity Co., 44 Cal. App 4,h 194, 303 (1996)).
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that quasi-contracts unlike implied contracts "are not based on the
apparent intention of the parties to undertake the perfom1ances in
are
question, nor are they promises."49 Rather, quasi-contract
obligations created by law for r asons of j ustice," as with one spouse's
duty to pay for "neces ary clothing and suppl ies' purchased by the other,
particularly where the spouses are separated even though the obligated
spouse gained nothing from the purcha e, and where, in fact, the obligated
spou e directed the eller not to furnish such clothing and 'upplies. 50
Where , uch a qua i-contract doctrine obligate a private party in a
pending case to yield property there is a governmental anction of a loss
of a nonfundamental, constitutionally protected interest,5 1 which may be
ubject to rationa l ba is scrutiny. 52 Justice here may involve the earlier
assumption of a duty of support by the obliged spouse, unti l the mafl'iage
i dissolved not unlike the common authority doctrine in Fourth
Amendment cases where one roommate yields the power to consent to a
warrantless search of shared premises until the joint occupancy has ended.
The term quasi-contract ha al o been employed in a different way.
For example 'a contract implied in law (also called a quasi-contract)"
obligated a local school board when its superintendent and its board
president signed a contract with a con truction company for postfire
ervices at a high chool that benefitted the chool board even though tbe
contract was void ab initio (i.e. no board vote and no bidding proce. s). 53
RESTATEMENT(S ECOND) OF ONTRACTS § 4 cmt. b (AM . LAW INST. 19 1).
Id. § 4 cmt. b, illus. 3. The llprcme Court of Wisconsin recognized some fonn of a
spou al necessity doctrine in harpe Furniture, Inc. ,,. Buckstajf, 299 N. W.2d 219, 224 (Wi .
1980) (n..'Cognizing a legally necessary item"); see al ·o Bartom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc.,
618 N.E.2d I, 8 (Ind. 1993) (noting thal "the law will impose limited scconda.ry liability upon
the financially superior spouse' ); Dubois v. DcLann, 578 A.2d 1250, 1255 (N.J. Super. t.
App. Div. 1990) (applying tho "doctrine of necessaries-.. to require a wire to pay for her
husband 's lega.l cxpcoscs incurred to preserve marital assets or 10 pcrmil husband ''to continue
his nonnnl life"). A court st nick down a spousal necessary duty on equality grounds in
Condore v. Prince George's Cotmty, 425 A.2d IO11, IO 19 (Md. 1981 ).
51
Whc11 a court compels nc private party in a.civil action to pass property onto a
second private party the state must act for due process purposes. See Fuentes v. Sbevin, 407
U.S. 67, 96 ( 1972) (holding that prejudgment rcplcvin statu tes employed by a private creditor
against a debtor resu lted in a property deprivation without procedural due process of law).
Yel, the private I.aw claim under stale law which permit such a court order, wilh adequate
procedural protections, may not be state action oven if 1ho property passed hos substantive
constitutioDal prolection from arbitrary, and more direct, governmental action. Chemcrinsky,
supra no1e 43, at 504, 507-08. Even where there is not stale action, the state laws allowing
innocent property losses shou ld still be rational.
52
See Washington v. Glucksbcrg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (regarding due pro ess):
Price v. Tanner, 855 f .2d 820, 823 (I Ith Cir. 1988) (regarding equal protection).
5l
Restore Coostr. Co., v. Proviso Tp. High Schools .. 133 N.E.3d 71 , 79, 83 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2019), affirmed, 2020 IL 125133 ,i,r 3 39 (finding a "quasi-contract or contract implied
,jq
50
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Another court similarly found a contract implied in law when one
knowingly and voluntarily received and benefitted from non-gratuitous
services provided by nonfamily members, like food delivery, medication
assistance, yardwork, and building maintenance. 54 Unlike the obliged
spouse in the ALI Restatement, however, here contract performance
actually significantly benefitted those contractually bound. 55

D. Lawyer Agency in Jury Trial Cases
The federal laws on constitutional criminal and civil jury trial rights
demonstrate the variations in the standards for innocent losses of
somewhat comparable constitutional rights. Procedural laws significantly
ensure criminal jury trial waivers are actually consensual, 56 meaning they
are informed, voluntary, and undertaken only by the rightsholders. 57 By
contrast, civil jury trial losses can be significantly less voluntary, such as
instances where lawyer agents' careless acts solely prompt client losses,
even where the clients expressly indicate their desires for trials by their
peers. 58
The ALI Restatement on the Law Governing Lawyers (hereinafter,
the "Restatement on the Law Governing Lawyers") recognizes the
differentiations between lost criminal and lost civil jury trial rights. 59 It
declares that, unless "the client has validly authorized the lawyer to make"
the decision, the client should personally undertake the general waiver of
the criminal jury trial right generally. 60 It further notes that the lawyer
in law"). The Appellate Court also recognized recovery could be grounded on a quantum
meruit theory to "prevent injustice." Restore Construction Co., 133 N.E.3d. at 79. The
Appellate Court distinguished contracts "implied in law" from contracts "implied in fact." Id.
at 80-81; see also Trapani Const. Co., v. Elliot Group, Inc., 64 N.E.3d 132, 142 (Ill. App. Ct.
2016) ( elaborating on the distinction); Woodfield Lanes, Inc. v. Village of Schaumburg, 523
N.E.2d 36, 40 (lll. App. Ct. l 988) ("[A] contract implied by law without regard to agreements
or promises between the parties when the contract must be imposed upon the parties in order
to avoid an inequitable result. ... ") (finding, here, a governmental body was contractually
obligated to provide compensation because it took benefits arising from the acts of a private
party but then, notwithstanding an ordinance, had failed to compensate the private party).
54
In re Estate ofMilbom, 461 N.E.2d 1075, 1077-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
55
Id. at 1078.
56
See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§
2321 n.19 (4th ed. 2008).
57
Jeffrey A. Parness, The Constitutional Limits on Custodial and Support Parentage
by Consent, 56 IDAHO L. REV. 421, 456 (2020).
58
Id.
59
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 22(1)
(AM. LAW INST. 1998).
60
Id.
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cannot even employ such a valid authorization where the relevant criminal
procedure laws, as they usually do, dictate "the client' s personal
participation or approval." 61 By contrast thi Restatement doe not
generally reserve to clients decisions on civil jury trial waivers. 62
Rule Eleven of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure speaks to
criminal jury trial waivers when pleas are taken. 63 The rule seeks to ensure
actual consent from the criminally accused. 64 The rule provides that before
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, "the court must address the
defendant personally in open court ... and determine that the defendant
understands ... the right to a jury trial." 65 The plea may only be accepted
if the court determines "that the plea i voluntary and did not result from
force, tlu·eats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement)." 66
As well, any judgment entered on a plea is contingent on a finding that
"there is a factual basis for the plea. " 67 State criminal procedure laws are
sometimes similar, 68 embodying the requisites attending federal
constitutional criminal jury trial right. 69
Id. § 22(2).
Id.§ 22(1).
63
FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(b)(l)(F).
64
See FED. R. CRIM. P. l l(b)(l)(C).
65
Id. Compare id., with People v. Bracey, 821 N.E.2d 253, 257-58 (Ill . 2004)
(determining that a jury trial waiver is valid if made by criminal defense counsel in open court
in the defendant's presence, without any objection by the defendant).
66
FED. R. CRIM. P. l l(b)(2). A written waiver by one criminally accused may, by
itself, be insufficient to constitute a voluntary waiver. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 126 N .E.3d
570, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
67
FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(b)(3). The Constitution does not compel this rule for the state
courts. See, e.g., Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 368 (5th Cir. 2000). This is not to say
that, in practice, federal criminal case pleas are usually taken fairly. See, e.g., Julian A. Cook
III, Federal Guilty Pleas: Inequities, Indigence, and the Rule I 1 Process, 60 B.C. L. REV.
1073, 1076, 1078 (2019) (explaining why "expediency and facial compliance with [FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11] (as opposed to searching inquiries regarding a defendant's knowledge and
coercive influences) characterize federal-court procedure," while discussing "how the[]
shortfalls affect federal defendants generally, and the indigent class in particular, and propose
a pathway to reform"). For more U.S. Supreme Court guidance on how plea deals should be
construed when disputes arise, see generally Colin Miller, Plea Agreements as Constitutional
Contracts, 97 N.C. L. REV. 31 (2018) (urging a need to incorporate into FED. R. CRIM. P. 11
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
68
See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P 17 .3; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b ). But see People v. Burge,
147 N.E.3d 896, 901, 904, 906, 911 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (noting that Criminal Procedure Code
has separate "directory" provisions on criminal pleas "at arraignment" that differ from the rule
provisions on post-arraignment pleas, though the statute may violate separation of powers
principles by intruding on Supreme Court rulemaking).
69
See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 431 P.3d 1274, 1286--89 (Haw. 2018). There are some
non-constitutional requirements on criminal guilty plea colloquies prompting conflicting
precedents. See, e.g., State v. Hagan, 126 N.E.3d 1214, 1220-21 (Ohio App. Ct. 2019)
61

62
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Where a criminal case is not resolved by a plea and will be tried in a
federal district court, if "the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial
must be by jury unlessO ... the defendant waives a jury trial right in
writing[,] . .. the government consent [,] and ... the coutt approves. ao
Federal Civil Procedure Rule (Fed. R. Civ. P.) 38 speak very
differently about civil jury trial waivers.7 1 The rule requires a timely
writtenjwy trial demand, whose absence can prompt a waiver by a party. 72
One prominent federal civil practice treatise concludes, "it seem clear
that the test of waiver that is applied to other con titutional right , that
there must be 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege, is not fully applicable to the jmy trial context. '7
While, in exercising its discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b), a district
court may overlook civil jury trial waivers, there is sometimes no finding
of abuse of discretion where counsel's inadvertence produces the failure
to overlook a waiver. 74 Some state civil procedure jury trial laws are
similar. 75
(considering a conflict over whether a trial court must specifically notify n criminal defendant
of the communi ty notification requirements attending a guilty pica to certain ·ex offender
crimes); see also United States v. Yansanc 370 F. Supp. 3d 580, 589- 90 {D. Md. 2019);
Uni led States v. Lisle, 2019 WL 2648771 , slip op. at *6 (D. Mc. Jun. 27, 2019) (each
recognizing open question on the requirements of Padilla v. K(fntucky, 559 U.S. 356 (20 I 0) on
trial judges speaking 10 the immigration con cqucnccs of criminal guilty pleas that arc direct
rather than collateral). Colloquy failures will be nonconscqucntial in hannlc error sc1tings.
See, e.g., United States v. Zacahua, 940 F.3d 342, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2019).
7° FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). Again, state rules arc often similar. See, e.g., ME. R. CRIM.
P. 23(a): W. VA. R. RIM P. 23(a). Of course, criminal defense coun ·cl can negatively impact
a defendant's exercise or the jury trial right by conceding during closing statement the
defendant's guilt on some counts. But see People v. Bums, 38 Cal. Rplr. 3d 442, 446 (Cal.
App. 5th 2019) (rejecting argument that d"ifendant's counsel's concession to guilt on a charge
violated his constitutional rights).
11
See FED. R. Ctv. P. 38.
72
FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b), (d).
73
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56 (internal citations omitted) (noting, however, that
there is a "presumption against jury trial waiver.").
14
See, e.g. , BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 168, 173-74
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (collecting cases).
15
See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 2- l !05(a) (2015) (mandating that untimely civil
jury trial demand by either a plaintiff or a defendant prompts a jury trial right waiver); CAL. R.
Ctv. P. 631 (f) (mandating that civil jury trial waiver by, e.g. failing to timely pay the required
nonrefundable foe or failing to announce that a jury is required al the time the cau c is first set
for trial, should the cause be set upon notice or stipulation); FLA. R. IV. P. l.430(d)
(mandating that civil jury trial right be waived if not properly dcmnndcd). In California, the
statutory methods or accompli hing civil jury trial waivers have been deemed cxclus·ivc so
that only limited fonns of attorney conduct operate. See Chen v. Lin, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 386,
390 (Cal. App. Dcp't Super. Ct. 2019) (ruling that contrary local court rulcmaking is
preempted); see also Duran v. Pick.wick tagcs Sys., 35 P.2d. 148 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934)
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In cases wherein lawyers represent civil litigants, lawyers' failures
to undertake effective jury trial demands can prompt jury trial right losses
by clients. There are no explicit dictates on in-court hearings or writing
requirements that seek to insure the losses of civil jury trial rights are
knowing and voluntary, either on the part of the lawyers or their clients. 76
Then-Judges Neil Gorsuch and Susan Graber proposed Fed. R. Civ. P.
amendments in 2016 that would ensure a civil jury trial for a party "unless
the party waives a jury, in writing." 77 The Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules did not move forward with the proposal in April of 2017. 78

E. Lawyer Agency Beyond Jury Trial Cases
Litigants can innocently lose federal constitutional hearing
opportunities beyond jury trial rights in both criminal and civil cases. Such
losses can arise, for example, due to procedural law violations, such as a
lawyer's deficient or untimely requests regarding witness testimony, or to
ethical law violations, like a lawyer settling a client's civil claims without
actual client consent. 79
The judicial system traditionally protects more greatly the
constitutional hearing opportunities of those criminally accused, whether
in federal or state courts. 80 Here, very significant life, liberty, and property
interests are often at stake. 81 Thus, before a guilty plea can prompt a

(reviewing cases demonstrating judicial discretion on statutory waivers, as well as the
California Constitution, Art. l, §7, which recognizes civil jury trial waivers by means of
conscnl 'as may be prescribed by law''). Compare Byram v. Superior Court 141 Cal. Rptr.
604, 607-08 (Cal. App. 3d 1977) ("[T)he denia l of a jury trial after wai ver where no prejudice
is shown to the other party or to the court is prqudicial."), with Hernandez v. Power Constr.
Co., 382 N .E.2d 1201, 1203 (Ill. 1978) (finding that the absence of inconvenience or prejudice
to adversary does not alone justify excusing a late jury trial demand).
76
Case precedents are more reluctant to find waivers where actions by lawyers were
inadvertent or where the litigants were proceeding prose. See, e.g., Solis v. County of Los
Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 956, 956 n.12 (9th Cir. 2008).
77
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES 173 (Comm. Rep. 2016),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-11-civil-agenda_ book_O.pdf.
78
See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES 628 (Comm. Rep. 2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committeerulcs-civil-procedure-may-2017.
79
For more on lawyers' professional responsibility in trial preparation, specifically
within e-discovery, see Beryl A. Howell, Lawyers on the Hook: Counsel's Professional
Responsibility to Provide Quality Assurance in Electronic Discovery, 2 J. SEC. LAW, REG. &
COMPLIANCE 216, 225 (2008).
80
See discussion supra Section II D.
81
See Donohue, supra note 21, at 402 (discussing life, liberty, and property interests
implicated).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3750288

290

QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:275

federal court conviction, 82 under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
district judges must personally address the criminally accused and receive
assurance that there are informed and voluntary waivers of such hearing
opportunities, as "the right at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, . . . to testify and present evidence, and to compel the
attendance of witnesses." 83 Judges should reject proposed plea agreements
where there were no such informed and voluntary waivers. 84 State cases
generally afford similar protections to the criminally accused. 85 This does
not mean that the criminally accused need to be informed on all the effects
of their guilty pleas. 86
82
This is not to say there is no room for improvement. See, e.g., Jenia I. Turner,
Transparency in Plea Bargaining, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973, 976 (2021) (noting that lack
of transparency in plea bargaining prevents adequate oversight of coercive pica bargains,
causes untruthful guilty pleas and inequality among defendants, hinders criminal defense
attorneys' work, impairs victims' rights, and inhibits informed public debate); Michael D.
Cicchini, Under the Gun: Plea Bargains and the Arbitrary Deadline, 93 TEMP. L. REV. 89, 91
(2020) (urging the need to abolish arbitrary deadlines to complete plea bargains).
83
FED. R. C!V. P. l l(b)(l)(A), (E), (F). On the rationales for requiring such colloquies,
see, for example, United States v. Shorty, 741 F.3d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 2013). The attributes of
the colloquies between trial judges and criminal defendants regarding constitutional right
waivers can differ depending upon the right. See, e.g., Tatum v. Foster, 847 F.3d 459, 460-61,
464 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating the difference between competency to stand trial and selfrepresentation colloquy); People v. Johnson, 126 N.E.3d 570, 574 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)
(identifying a colloquy regarding trial waiver though defendant signing a jury trial waiver
form); Dunn v. State, 434 P.3d 1, 3 (Oki. Crim. App. 2018) (due process right to be present at
cvidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw a pica cannot be waived by counsel alone).
It has been suggested that pre-pica procedures go beyond such colloquies. See, e.g., William
Ortman, Corifrontation in the Age of Plea Bargaining, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 52) (suggesting a pre-plea Sixth Amendment deposition opportunity in
order to recognize the defendant's right to c~nfront adverse witnesses on whose testimony the
government relied in bringing a prosecution).
84
See United States. v. Soon Dong Han, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(rejecting proposed plea). For effective assistance of counsel in criminal plea-bargaining
process, see, for example, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985) (applying Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). On the right to effective assistance of counsel during
criminal case pleas in state criminal courts, see generally, for example, Kremer v. State, 945
N.W.2d 279 (N.D. 2020) (affriming district court order denying defendant's request to
withdraw guilty pleas on basis of ineffective assistance of counsel).
85
See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2(a)(3) (stating a court must personally address a
criminal defendant in determining "the defendant understands[] ... the constitutional rights
that the defendant foregoes by pleading guilty."); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.4(e) (employing similar
language as the Arizona rule); see also, e.g., People v. Thomas, 144 N.E.3d 970, 973, 982
(N.Y. 2019) (determining that waivers by the criminally accused during colloquies can be
sustained, even when they differ from the language in the written trial waiver form).
86
See, e.g., People v. Burge, 147 N.E.3d 896, 908 (Ill. App·. Ct. 2019) (finding failure
to admonish criminally accused of collateral consequences of guilty plea is not a
constitutional violation, but may prompt remedy if "real justice" is denied); State v. Straley,
147 N.E.3d 623, 626, 628 (Ohio 2019) (finding failure to inform criminally accused that

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3750288

)

2021] INNOCENT LOSSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

291

Notwithstanding these protections in guilty plea proceedings,87 the
judicial system does not comparably enforce protections of hearing
opportunities during jury trials often. 8 Explicit consents to waivers of
procedural rights by the accused are usually unnecessary. 89 Unilateral
actions by counsel can dimini h or de troy the accused's hearing
opportuuities. 90 Thus, as for the accused s right to a speedy trial, "delay
caused by . . . defendant s couns I'' may strip the accused of this
protection,91 though this general rule attributing to the defendant delay
caused by ... counsel. is not absolute."92 Attribution of counsel actions
to a criminal defendant i seemingly more likely when the defendant,
through counsel attempt ' to evade the con equences of an unsuccessful
tactical deci ion."93 While tate laws can provide the criminally accu ed
certain aspects of sentencing were mandatory, not discretionary, did not amount to "manifest
injustice" allowing a pica withdrawal ancr the impo ilion of the sentence). Compare Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S . 356, 360 (20 I 0) (fi.nding ineffective legal assistance to crim inally accused
when no advice was given on the automatic deportation which would follow a guilty plea,
where the law on deportation was clear), with State v. Aduka, 812 S.E.2d 266, 269-70 (Ga.
2018) (finding no ineffective assistance claim where law on deportation following a guilty
plea was unclear).
87
This is not to say that all procedural law protections for the criminally accused
during plea hearings are strictly enforced. See, e.g., United tates v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 612
(2013), (finding no automatic vacatur due lo a FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (h) vio lation).
8K
Con idcr, for example, the accused's right to effective assistance of counsel. Here, a
lawyer's failure may not necessarily lead to a n,~w trial. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perez
138 N.E.3d 1028, 1035-37 (Mass. 2020) (requiring that counsel's failures to likely influence
the jury for a new trial).
89
See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. l 7.2(a)(3); ARK. ll. CRIM. P. 24.4(e).
90
See, e.g., Gonzalez. v. United States, 553 U.S . 242, 248-51 (2008) (requiring no
particular consent From client; finding hearing opportunities waivable by counsel include
having a federal district judge, not a magistrate judge preside over voir dire and jury
election what arguments to pursue, what cvidcnliary objections to mi e, and what
agreements to conclude regardi ng the admission of evidence). When criminal defense counsel
omits key arguments, there arc limits on how courts can fill in the missing analyses. See, e.g,
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1581-82 (2020) (finding that the court
cannot radically transform counsel's arguments); see also Erum v. Llego, 465 P.3d 815, 828
n. 19 (Haw. 2020) (finding that "principle of party presentation" generally docs not operate
with pro sc litigants). Unilateral lawyer conduct on appeal can also prompt client losses. But
·ee United States . Desotcll, 929 F.3d 82 1, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2019) (acknowledging a circuit
split on a criminal defense lawyer's ability to waive a defendant's objection to a search by not
raising the issue in an opening brief during an appeal).
91
Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 9<l--91 (2009).
92
Id. at 94 (noting that d lay resulting from a systemic breakdown in the public
defender system may not be charged to the defendant); see also Mathewson v. State, 438 P.3d
189, 209-11 (Wyo. 2019) (reviewing and applying speedy trial right guidelines set out in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530--33 (1972)).
93
United States. v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203 (1995) (considering where a
criminal defendant could not complain on appeal about the admission into evidence of
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with greater hearing opportunities than are afforded tmder the federal
constitution,94 counsel's actions can, here as well, generate hearing
opportunity losses.
TriaJ losses of the criminally accused's hearing opportunities95 are
less likely to be deemed innocent where the lawyer acts as an agent of,
and under the direction of, the accused.96 Here losse are justifi d. Losses
are more innocent when the lawyer acts in ways directly contrary to the
expressed wishes of the accused, who nevertheless is bound by the
lawyer's acts. 97 Yet, contrary wishes notwithstanding (perhaps earlier
shielded by attorney-client communication privilege),98 a criminally
accused can innocently lose hearing opportunities and can be often bound
by her attorney's acti.ons (even when not tacticaJ), 99 as long as the attorney
acted in an objectively reasonable way and, but for her actions, the
criminally accused probably would not have seen different results. 100
Protections for the criminally accused against lawyer-produced and,
thus, innocent losses of procedural rights sometimes can occur without
time-consuming and expensive inquiries into objective reasonableness
testimony to which there was no objection per FRE 103(a) (internal quotations omitted); see

also People v. Massey, 142 N.E.Jd 803, 809 (lll. App. Ct. 2019) (defining ineffective

assistance of criminal trial counsel to mean " performance [that] was objectively
unreasonable" and that cau cd a "different" outcome; awarding great deference to counsel's
strategic decision , with counsel's acts strongly presumed to be reasonable); People v.
Walker, 131 N.E.3d 136, 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (classifying a decision by criminal defense
counsel on sharing/discussing items received in discovery as "a matter of trial strategy"
entitled to "strong presumption" of attorney competence).
94
See, e.g., State v. Vincenty, 202 A .3d [273, 1278 (N.J. 2019) (noting that common
law privilege against self-incrimination affords greater protection than docs the federal
constitution); State v. Shaw, 207 A.3d 229, 246 (N.J . 2019) (concluding that the N.J.
constitution is more protective than Fec!fral constitution "when it comes to consent searches.").
95
Hearing opportunities at sentencing, as well as at trial, can b innocently lost. See,
e.g., Andrus v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1875, 1878 (2020).
96
Of course, such direction will be discounted when the acting lawyer provided
ineffective assistance. See Day v. United States, 962 F .3d 987, 988-89 (7th Cir. 2020)
( considering an accused's receipt of bad advice when rejecting pica deal).
97
See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (2018) (characterizing the lawyer as a
"counselor" to its clients).
98
See Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. R6 V. 1061 , 1062 (1978) (explaining the importance of attorney-client
privilege within the crimina.1 arena).
99
See, e.g., People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337 at *4, 6 (Ill. Aug. 20, 2020)
( determining that a defendant ' s guilty pica cannot be challenged on grounds that no
prcscntcncc investigation report was ever done since the i uc was not. raised (or three years).
100
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S . 668, 694 (1984). On assessment ofa
defendant's probable guilt, even with effective counsel, see People v. Nieto-Roman, 152
N.E.3d 547, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). On assessment ofa defense lawyer's effectiveness, see
People v. Johnson, 153 N.E.3d 156, 166 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
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and the possibilities of different results. Consider the recent amendments
to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) effective in December of 2020 101
which establi h the prosecutor s obligation to give notice of an intended
use of evidence under Rule 404(b), whether or not the defense attorney
makes a request for sucb a notice. 102
By contrast, the judicial ystem protects less vigorously the
constitutional hearing opportunitie of civil litigants, whether in federal or
state courts. 103 For example, civil litigant sometimes lose hearing
opportunities for their claims where their attorneys settle the claims
without client consultations, at times over their clients expr s rejections
of the offers to which the client are then bound. 104 Losses can arise due
to the apparent 105 or presumed attorney settlement authority 106 which may
lack ability to be overcome. 107 Other attorney conduct involving for

See FED. R. EVID. 404.
FED. R. Evm. 404(b), advisory committee's note to 2020 amendment.
103
Some civil litigants, like those facing involuntary civil commihnenls or terminations
of parental rights, do have greater procedural due process rights than most other civil litigants.
On involuntary civil commitments of cxually dangerous per ons, see 725 lLL. COMI'. TAT.§
3.01 (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt); 725 LLL... COMP. STA •. § 5 (2013) (regarding
rights to counsel and jury trial), reviewed, People v. Tr.1inor, 752 N.E.2d I 055, I 057 (111.
2001). On parental rights terminations, see J.B. v. Florida Ocp lofChildren & Families, 170
So. 3d 780, 785 (Fla. 2015) (determining lhat parents have right to effective counsel when
state eeks to terminate their parental rights); NJ. Div. of Youth & Family Services v. B.R.,
929 A.2d I 034, I038 (N.J. 2007) (adopting effective counsel norms for criminal cases).
10 4
Parness, supra note 57, at 460.
)OS
See Robertson v. Alling, 351 P.3d 352, 356 (Ariz. 2015) (citing RfiSTATl3MENT
(THtllD) OF LAW GOVERNING l,AWYBRS § 27); Reutzel v. Douglas. 870 A.2d 787, 793 (Pa.
2005) (recognizing apparent aulbority even where settling attorney commits fraud).
•06
See /11 re Artha Mgmt, Inc., 91 F.Jd 326, 328-29 (2d Cir. 1996); Makins v. District
of Columbia, 861 A.2d 590, 593 (D.C. 2004).
107
See, e.g., Brcwcrv. Nat'! R.R . Pas enger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, I 334 (111. 1995)
(recognizing a rcbuttable presumption ofattomey·s in-court settlement authority rebutted by
client's and attorney's affidavits); Condon & Cook, LLC v. Mavrakis. 69 N.E.3d 274, 285-86
(Ill. App. CL 2016) (disallowing overcoming of presumed in-court attorney settlement
auU1ority where client ratified auomey's acts .
IOI

102
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example, pleading/ 08 discovery, 109 or trial practice 110 failures may yield
lost hearing opportunities.
The constitutional hearing opportunities of certain civil litigants are
heightened when more significant Ufe, liberty, or property interests a:re at
stake. Courts recognize most significant interests in proceedings
involving involuntary civil commitment (e.g., as with a sexual
predator), 111 punitive damage assessments, 112 child guardianships, 113 and
termination of parental rights. 114 Here, hearing opportunities for civil
litigants should be more difficult to lose, whether by a personal consent' 15
or by an attorney agent. 116 Yet, the protections against innocent losses of
103
See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6) (providing a method for dismissal for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted). But see FED. R . IV. P. J l(c)(4) (noting that

sanction is " limited 10 what suffices ro deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct
by other similarity situated.").
1®
See e.g., FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(g)(J )-(3) (providing sanctions for signing failure by
attorney regarding di covcry " request, response, or objection" can be imposed on "tho party
on whose bchalfd1e signer was acting."); Devault v. tcvcn L. Herndon, Prof'! Ass'n 684 P.
2d 978, 979-80 (Idaho 1984) (finding that attorney' discovery failures lead t dismissal of
client's claim; inability to "penalize" client for attorney 's acts 'would make for disorder an I
preclude effective judicial administration in the trial court.").
110
Compare Temple v. Providence Care tr. , 233 A.3d 750, 762--63 (Pa. 2020)
(recognizi ng defendant 's loss of new trial opportunity when motion for new tria l or rcqucsl for
mistrial wa not timely and spccilically made al trial and in po I-trial motion; some Joss,
though, was attributed to the altorncy 's "strategic choice"), with Doc v. Parri llo, 2020 IL App
( Isl) 191286, al •s, •9 (!II. App. t. cpt. 28, 2020) (deicrmining that defense counsel'
fai lure to participate in trial resulted in a one million dollar j udgment; defendant "shares
responsibility for his counsel·' choice ," thoug h court found that it did " not know'' when the
defendant learned of his counsel' s refusal to participate).
111
See, e.g., 725 IL.L. COMP. S'rAT. § 3.01 (mandating commilling of sex ually
dangcrou persons only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5
(2013) (pcrrnilling eommiuing se,rnally dangerous per ens only aficr being afforded the right
to be represented by counsel, al stale expense if there is indigcncy).
112
See, e.g., BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585- 86 (1996) (imposing
fed ral du proces limits on punitive damage award ).
, u See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.E. V., 141 A. d 254, 269 (N.J. 2016) (recognizing a
need for colloquy with a parent who want self-representation).
114
See, e.g., Santosky v. Kromer, 456 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (recognizing that federal
due process requires clear and convincing evidence before any lcrmination of parental rights
ihrough a court judgment).
IIS
See, e.g., RESl'ATl:M NT( ECOND) OF TORTS§ 892A(l) {AM. LAW INST. 1979)
("One who effectively consents to conduct ofnnolhcr intended lo invade his interests cannot
recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it."); id. § 892C(2)
(rendering ineffective consent if one is a member of a class specially protected by criminal
Jaws).
11 6
See Primera Beef, LL v. Ward, 457 P. 3d 161 , 166-69, 172 (Idaho 2000)
(determining I.hat, while an attorney who is acting or communicating during bis/her
representation of a client is presumed to be acting on behalf of that client, the presumption
docs not reach lo an attorney's implied authority to acts resulting in " the urrcnder or giving
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hearing right in civil cases typically should not be as strong as the
protections afforded the criminally accused. 117
When civil litigants are proceeding pro e, cmuts sometimes expand
hearing opportunities to further mitigate any innocent losses of
constitutional due process interest .118 For example, as one federal circuit
held, federal district courts must abide by the general rule that pro se
plaintiffs receive special notices on the consequences offaiJfag to respond
to sununary judgment motions with affidavits or otheiwi e. 119
Civil litigants can lose certain civil case hearing opportunities even
before civil actions commence. For example, if a party is incarcerated,
that party has no constitutional right to be made available in person in
order to testify in a pending civil action. 120 Here, the loss may be innocent,

up any ubslantial right of lbc client.") (quoting Cameron ales, Inc. v. Klemish, 463 P.2d
287, 291 (Idaho 1970) (intemal markings omitted)); Muncey v. Children s Home Finding &
Aid Soc. of Lewiston, 369 P.2d 586, 589 (Idaho 1962) (addressing consent in scttlemcnl). In
Primera, the court assessed attorney agency by looking to, inter a/ia, the general jury
instructions on agent authority; general common law principles on agency; and the ALI
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LA WYERS. Primera, 457 P.3d al 166-70. In
Klemish, substantial rights included decisions on settlements. 463 P.3d at 291- 92. In Muncey ,
substantial rights incl.uded dcci ion on scUlcmcntll and on taking ap_pcal . 369 P.2<l at 589;
see also /11 re Adoption of K.T.8 ., 472 P.3d 843, 857- 58 (Utah 2020) (finding a sub tantive
due process violation whore mother could not intervene in an adoption case involving her
child because her lawyer failed to fi le a memo upporting an answer ro a petition to tcnninatc
parental rights)· In re Adoption of Child by C.J., 231 A.3d 765, 769- 70 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 2020) (making sua spo11te dctem1ination of incffcc1ivc assistance of counsel in a parental
righls termination proceeding accompanying an adoption petitio11; no need lo show prejudice
as there was a "structural failure in the process" and no hannlcss c1ror analysi is needed as
the consequences are "necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.") (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
117
See, e.g., New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. R.L.M., 236 NJ. 123,
150(2018) (finding a colloquy with parent who wants elf-representation "need not be as
comprehensive as the coUoquy mandated when a criminal defendant seeks to proceed
unrepresented."); In re K.C. & A.C., 2019 WL 1766072, at *3 (W. Va. Apr. 19, 2019)
(detailing factor for determining whether incarcerated paront bas a right to attend a parental
rights termination proceeding in pcl'Son).
I is
See, e.g., Solis v. County of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 956 n. 12 (9th Cir. 2008).
119
Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Savis, Inc. v. Cardenas,
slip op. 2020 WL 4736411, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2020) (finding local court rule
requirements failed to satisfy the Timms standard).
120 See, e.g., Myers v. Emke, 476 N.W.2d 84, 85 {Iowa 1991) (noting inmate cou ld
supply bis testimony by deposition); Clements v. Moncrief, 549 o.2d 479, 481 (Ala. 1989)
("(A] prisoner has no right to be removed from his place of confioomcot in order that he might
appear and testify in his own behalf in a civil suit unrelated to his confinement."). Compare
Curtiss v. Curtiss, 886 N. W.2d 565, 568- 69 (N.D. 2016) (noting that prisoners have
"diminished constitutional protections, but they maintain a due process right to reasonable
access to the courts."), with Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 161 (Ind. App. 2019)
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since the party's earlier conduct has no relationship to any desire to forego
later procedural rights. 121 Further, current civil litigants can also lose, via
earlier, pre-suit contracts, certain hearing opportunitie , like jury trial
rights 122 or personal jurisdiction defenses. 123 Here, the loss is far les
innocent, as a party consented to a loss of a later procedural right. Yet,
many see the unfairness, if not invalidity, of such contracts as involving
innocent losses, as the consent standards do not require knowing,
voluntary, and informed assents. 124
F. De Facto Parentage Cases

The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)-but neither of its
earlier UPAs (1973 UPA and 2000 UPA-expressly recognizes "de
facto" parenthood as a form of childcare parentage for those without
biological or formal adoption ties. 125 Such parenthood arises from quite
explicit agreements for shared custody between an existing legal parent

(determining a father's absence due to military service could not be considered a factor in
awarding mother sole legal custody of child).
121
See Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d at 160-61.
122
See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (including compulsory and
binding arbitration pacts).
123
See, e.g., Nat'! Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 3 l l, 312-14 (1964),
(involving pre-suit waiver by nonresident of personal jurisdiction objections in an equipment
lease contract); see also Burger King v. Rudzcwicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985) (involving prcsuit choice of law clause); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S . 585, 587 (1991)
(involving pre-suit forum selection clause).
124
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, l24 YALE L.J. 2804, 2804
("[A]rbitration [is] not a vindication but an unconstitutional evisceration of statutory and
common law rights.")
125
The term "de facto" parent did not originate in the 2017 UPA. The Comment to the
Act indicates its de facto parentage standard was modeled on Maine and Delaware statutes.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017). The term has also been
employed by the American Law Institute (ALI). Its 2002 Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution defines a de facto parent as "one other than a legal parent or parent by estoppel."
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION§§ 2.03(l)(c), 3.02(l)(c) (AM. LAW INST.
2002). Its Council Draft No. 2 (Mar. 20, 2019) of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: CHILDREN
AND THE LA w defines a de facto parent as a "third party who establishes ... that (1) the third
party lived with the child for a significant period of time" while assuming "significant
obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation;" establishing "a
bond and dependent" parental-like relationship; and receiving the consent of"a parent" to the
formation of this relationship. Appx. A,§ 1.82 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2,
2019).
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and a nonparent. 126 For de facto parentage, an existing legal parent must
"fosterO or supportO a "bonded and dependent relationship" between the
child and the nonparei1t who may become a de facto parent. 127 The
nonparent must undertake "full
and permanent" parental
respoo lbilities. 128
The 2017 UP A's de facto parentage provision is far more precise in
its details on parental-like acts and consent to shared parental authority
than is its provision on the two-year residency/hold out parentage
presumption. 129 While both de facto parentage and residency/hold out
parentage encompass human acts occurring at no particular time or in no
particular place, only de facto parentage require all of the following
conditions:
(a) A proceeding to establish parentage of a child under Lhis section may be
commenced only by an individual who: (1) is alive when the proceeding is
commenced· and (2) claims to be a de facto parent of the child.
(b) An individual who claims to be a de facto parent of a child must commence
a proceeding ... (1) before the child attains 18 years of age(] and (2) while the
child is alive ... .
(d) In a proceeding to adjudicate parentage of an individual who claims to be a
de facto parent of the child, if there is only one other individual who is a parent
or ha a claim to parentage of th child, the court hall adjudicate the individual
who claims to be a de facto parent to be a parent of the child if U1e individual
demoustrates by clear-and-convincing evidence that: (l) the individual resided
with the child a a regular member of the child's household for a significant.
period; (2) the individual engaged in consistent caretaking of the child; (3) lhe
individual undertook full and pennanent responsibilities of a parent of lhe child
without expectation of financial compensation; (4) the individual held ou( the
child as the individual' s child; (S) U1e individual established a bonded and
dependent relationship with the child which is parental in nature; (6) another
parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship
required under paragraph (S); and (7) continuing the relationship between the
individual and the child is in the best interest of the child.

126
Expecting legal parents, under the 2017 UPA, are not bound to any agreements on
de facto parentage for children to be born of sex later, as the model taw requires, e.g., "a
bonded and dependent relationship with the child." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609(d)(5) (UNIF.
LA w COMM'N 2017). Thus, a possible "bonded and dependent relationship" with a fetus, a
fertilized egg, or some child of sex yet unconceived, does not exist.
127
Id. § 609(d)(6).
128
id. § 609(d)(3).
12?
Id. § 204(a)(2) (expressing tliat common residency/hold out parentage i.nvolvcs a
nonparcnt who resided wilh a child for the first two years of lbc child's life while holding the
child as her/his own). The initial UPA, in 1973, differed significantly. UNlr. PARENTAG . Ac r
§ 4(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973) (mandating that common residency need not slarl al
child's birth, and only includes nonparcnts who were male).
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( e) . . . [I]n a proceeding to adjudicate parentage of an individual who claim to
be a de facto parent of the child, [if] there is more than one other individual who
is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child and the court detem1ines that
the requirements of subsection (d) are sati tied, the court shall adjudicate
parentage under Section 613. 13°

Clearly, de facto parentage, but not residency/hold out parentage,
requires human act that a nonparent and an existing legal parent
recognize as embodied within ve1y positive parent-child relation hip .
Of particular note, however is the 2017 UPA requirement that an
existing legal parent (i.e. "another parent'') "fo tered or supported" the
parental-like relationship between the child and the nonparent. 13 1 This
fostering and suppo11 seemingly can qualify a "actual consent" (whether
expres ' or "inferred") or as "apparent consent" to shared custody by the
one existing legal parent. While addre sing childcare arrangement
between one legal parent and a nonparent, the 2017 UP A does not mention
any conduct- consensual or otherwi e-involving a second existing legal
parent (like a noncustodial voluntary acknowledgment parent or a
presumed spousal parent), or any expecting l.egal parent (like a biological
father of a child bom of sex who maintains a paternity opporttmity
interest, or a biological mother, via egg donation, of a child who she
intended and till wishes to parent). 132 Such an unmentioned parent may
not even know of' an ther" parent's fostering and support. Under the
UP A language, it is quite conceivable that the fostering and support
nonparent may later become a de facto parent, concun-ent with the
effective term ination of the parentage interests of the unaware second
exi ·ting or expecting parent. 133
UN!f. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609(a), (b), (d), (c) (UN!F. LAW COMM'N 2017).
Id. § 609(d)(6).
There is, likewise, no such mention in the 2019 Draft of the ALi's Children and the
Law Restatement. See RESTATEMENT Of THE LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW Appx. A-B, §§
I . 0, I. I, l.82(a) (AM . LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
13
UNIF. PARBNTAO E ACT § 8J6(d) (UNlF. LAW COMM ' N 2017) (where there is no
state law recognition of the possibility of three or more cu todiul parents, a court must
"adjudicate parentage . .. in the best interest of the child,' with guiding factors enumerated).
In the 2017 UP A, there is provided no express and signi ticant mechanism for a second
existing legal, or an expecting legal parent, to challenge a petition to establish de facto
parentage. See id. § 609(e) (beyond the birth or adoptive parent, if there i another individual
'who is a parent or ha a claim to parentage of the chi ld" for whom an alleged de facto parent
seeks parental status, that individual' s interests must be adjudicated). Yet, one may wonder
how a court wou ld learn of this individual. One may also wonder whether it is reasonable to
assume that such an individual would likely know of the de facto parent petition and thus be
able to intervene. In Vermont, which. ubstantially enacted the 2017 UPA, an alleged de facto
parent's petition to adjudicate his/her "claim to parentage" is to be detennined by "clear and
130

13 1
132
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Also of note i the 2017 UPA provision that a proceeding to establish
de facto parentage may commence only at the hands of a living individual
claiming to a de facto parent. 134 Th.us upon a breakup of a family
re lationship between an individual and an existing legal parent and hi or
her child the parent or the child may not proceed to establish de facto
parentage in the individual for child supp01t pwposes. 135 By contrast an
existing l gal parent and/or the child (and others like a child-support
agency) may p ursue an alleged residency/bold out parent for support, 136
where unlike de facto parentage, there is no requirement of "consistent
caretaking" a "bonded and dependent relationship with the child," or the
undertaking of 'full and permanent responsibilities of a parent.' 137 Tbe
differences in the tanding norms present significant equal protection and
public policy concerns. 138 Oddly, the more that a live-in nonparent acts as
a parent, the les likely that nonparent can be pursued later as a parent for
child support. 139
The judicial community ha somewhat accepted the invitation in the
2017 UPA to innocent losses of childcare rights. 140 In Vermont, an
adjudication of de facto parentage "does not disestablish the parentage of

convincing evidence," with no explicit statutory mention of the participatory rights of a
nonresidential person with "a claim to parentage." VT. STAT. tit. 15C § 501(a)(l), (b) (2018).
But see id. § 206(a)(6) (in considering claims of de facto parentage, courts must consider the
"likelihood" of "harm to the child"); DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2013) (explaining de facto
parent norms, wherein there is not any pres umed parentage if the norms are met); id. § 8609(b) (adjudicated father may be challenged no later than two years after the adjudication).
While findings of de facto parc.ntage in favor of petitioners can cO'ectively terminate
parentage or parental opportunity interests for many, reasonable attempts to notify those with
possible terminated parental interests need not, al least expressly under the statutes, precede
sueb findings- unlike findings in formal adoption proceedings-should the petitions be
granted. See, e.g., id. ( laying out requirements for proceeding to adjudicate parentage).
134
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609(a) (UNIP. LAW COMM'N 2017). The 2019 Draft of the
ALI's Children and Law Restatement is similar as it speaks to "a de facto parent ... who
establishes" parenthood by evidence in order to seek an allocation of custodial or decisionmaking responsibility for a child. RESTATEMENT OfTH LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW§
l.82(a), (d), app. A (AM . LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
IJS
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609(a) (UNIP. LAW OMM'N 2017).
l36
Id. § 602 (describing who has standing to maintain a proceeding); id. § 204(a)(2)
( describing presumption of parentage within the context of residency); id. § 203 ("f A] parcntchild relationship established under this [A ]ct applies for all pui:poscsO ....").
13 7
UN[F. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609(d)(2), (3), (5) (UNlf". LAW COMM'N 2017).
13 8
See, e.g., Parness, supra note 57, at 427 n.12; Jeffrey A. Parness, Comparable
Pursuits of Hold Out and De Facto Parentage: Tweaking the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, 31
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 157, 170 (2018).
IJ9 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017) (outlining presumption
of parentage).
140
See statutes cited infra.
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any other parent." 141 Such an adjudicatory proceeding may include
judicial consideration of "a claim to parentage of the child' by another. 142
Yet, there is no explicit requirement for notice of the claim to an existing
or expecting parent with a competing claim to parentage. 143 Thus, a birth
mother's new spouse who is not a biological parent of the child could seek
de facto parent status, perhaps to accompany his/her presumed marital
parent status. He/she may do so to lessen-if not eliminate-any childcare
interest the birth mother's former residential, intimate partner who
supported the pregnancy or cared for the child for a while held, as well as
any childcare interest the biological father of a child who continues to
maintain a parentage opportunity interest in a child born of sex held.
While courts do not deem such a partner or father a legal parent, 144 each
individual has a constitutional parentage opportunity interest and thus
should be deemed an expecting legal parent. 145
Both the 2002 ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations 146 (hereinafter, the "2002 ALI
Principles") and the current ALI March 20, 2019 Draft (hereinafter, the
"2019 ALI Draft") for a new Restatement of the Law on Children and the
Law 147 recognize fonns of "de facto" parentage. Each of the forms
requires residence and consent by an existing legal parent, at times
without notice to or consensual acts by a second parent, either existing or
expecting. 148
The 2002 ALI Principles further recognize a "parent by estoppel,"
defined as an individual who lived with the child for at least two years,
14 1

142

VT. STAT. tit. !SC§ SOl(c) (20 17).

Id.§ 501 (b); see id.§ 206 (providing guidelines for " [a]djudicating competing

claims of parentage").
14 3
Id. § 502(a) (requiring petitions to be served on "all parents and legal guardians of
the child"). Bui see VT. STAT. til. lSC § 502(b) (perm itting an ' adverse party," presumably
including an intervenor, to fil e a response to a petition).
144 See UNIF. PARE TAOE A
§ 102(n)--{c) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017) (prov iding
various " pare nt" definitions).
145
Id. § 201 (describing crite ria for thee lablis hment of the parent-child relationship).
146
PRI NCIPLES OFTME LAW o r FAM ILY DISSOl, UTtON §§ 2.0J( t)(c), 3.02(l)(c) (AM.
LAW INST. 2002) (requiring residence with the child, as well as "the agreement o fa legal
parent to form a parent-ch ild relationship," unless the legal parent completely fa ils, or is
unable, "to perform carctaking functions").
147
R ESTATEMENTOFTH.E LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW§ l.82(a) (AM. LAW. INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (noting that requirements include residence with the child, as
well as establishment that "a parent consented to and fostered the formation of the parentchild relationsh ip").
148
PRIN Cll'LES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION§§ 2.03(1)(c), 3.02(l)(c) (AM.
LAW INST. 2002); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW§ l.82(a) (AM.
LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
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with "a reasonable, good-faith belief' of biological ties and who
continued to accept the responsibilities of fatherhood when the belief
ended; 149 an individual who lived with the child for at least two years
pursuant to an agreement with the child's legal pa.rent (or if there are two
legal parent both parents) and who held out parentage while accepting
"full and permanent" parental responsibilities, assuming the child's best
interests are served; 150 and an individual who lived with the child since
birth pursuant to a prior co-parenting an agreement with the child's legal
parent (or if there are two legal parents, both parents), asswning the
child' best interests are served. 151
The 2002 ALI Principles recognize as a "de facto parent' one who is
an individual "other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppe1" 152 and
who lived with and cared for the child for at least two years under an
"agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship. " 153 A de
facto parent, unlike a legal parent or a parent by estoppel, ha no
presumptive right to an allocation of decision-making responsibiJ ity for
the child. 154 Further, a de facto parent has no presumptive right of 'access
to the child's school and health-care records to which legal parents have
access by other law." 155

14 9
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03( I )(b)(ii) (AM. LAW
INST. 2002).
15o
Id.§ 2.03(l)(b)(iv).
151
Id. § 2.03(l)(b)(iii).
152
Id.§ 2.03(l)(c). A " legal pnrent" is "an individual who is defined as a parent under
other state law." PRINCIPLES OFTHB LAW OF FAMILY DI SOLUTION§ 2.03(\)(a) AM. LAW
INST. 2002).
ISJ
ld. § 2.03( l)(c). Alternatively, a de facto parcrll is one who is other than a legal
parent or a parent by esloppel and who lived with and cared for the child for at lea l two years
• as a result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform carctaking
function ." Id.§ 2.03(1)(c)(ii). Precedents predating the 2002 ALI Principles recognize the
concept of de facto parentage in different settings. See, e.g. In re Kicshia E., 859 P.2d 1290,
1296 (Cal. J993) (considering the standing of a de facto parent in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding); 111 re Dependency of 1.1-1., 81 S P.2d 1380, I 384 (Wa h. I 991) (finding, in a
delinqu.e ney case, pennissive intervention, not intervention as of right, is ava ilable to some
fo tcr parents claiming de facto, or psychological parent status)· In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244,
254 n.2 1 (Cal. 1974) (declining to resolve whether a de facto parent may have the same rights
of notice, hearing, or counsel as natural parents in Juvenile Court Law proceeding under due
process or equal protection principles). The Reporter' s otes to the 2002 ALI Principles
observe that "(t]he law lhal most closely approximates the criteria for a ' de facto' parent
relationship is that ofWiscon in," where "visitation (but not custody) may be awarded to an
individual who has formed a ' parent-like relationship' with a child." PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW
OFF AMILy Dl OLUT!ON . 2.03 cmt. c, reporter's notes (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
154
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION§ 209(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
155
Id. § 209(4).
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The 2019 ALI Draft describes a de facto parent as a third party who
establishes that he/she "lived with the child for a significant period of
time," was "in a parental role" long enough that he/she "established a bond
and dependent relationship . . . that is parental in nature," had no
"expectation of financial compensation," and that "a parent consented to"
the third party's parental-like role. 156
The 2019 ALI Draft and the 2002 ALI Principles on de facto
parentage, but not the 2002 ALI Principles on parentage by estoppel,
invite a new parentage designation that adversely impacts the childcare
interests of an existing, or expecting, legal parent without his or her actual
or apparent consent. 157 As with intentional torts, here too the ALI supports
a presumed consent approach. 158
Some American states had in 2017, or currently have, statutes or
common law precedents on nonmarital, nonbiological, and nonadaptive
custodial parentage similar to the suggested 2017 UP A and 2019 ALI
Draft de facto parent norms. For example, before 2017, the drafters of the
2017 UPA utilized 159 quite comparable Maine and Delaware statutes 160
and a less comparable Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent. 161 Since
2017, a few states have statutorily recognized de facto parenthood under
the 2017 UPA guidelines. 162
Current American state de facto parentage laws vary. 163 In Delaware,
courts can recognize a de facto parent as one who had "a parent-like
relationship" with "the support and consent of the child's parent," who
exercised "parental responsibility," and who "acted in a parental role for
a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent

156
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW§ l.82(a) (AM. LAW. INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (requiring establishment of each clement by clear and convincing
evidence).
157
See id. § l.82(a)(4) (defining de facto parent consent requirement); PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION : ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 2.03(l)(b)(iv),
(l)(c)(ii) (AM. LAW. INST. 2002) (defining both "de facto parent" and "parent by estoppel"
consent requirements).
158
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS§ 16(b)
(AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019) (defining presumed consent).
159
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
160
DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 8-20l(c) (West2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-a, § 1891(1), (3)
(2016).
161
In re Custody ofH.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (concluding that a
parental-like relationship can prompt visitation rights when in child's best interests).
162
See, e.g., 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-8.l-50l(a) (West 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. !SC
§ 501(a) (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE§ 26.26A.440(4) (2019).
163
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW§ 1.82 cmt. /, reporter's
note (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (summarizing various state laws).
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relationship with the child that is parental in nature." 164 In Washington, a
de facto parent must reside with the child for a significant period, engage
in consistent childcare, expect no financial compensation for acting in
parental manner have a bonded and dependent relationship that is
parental in nature, and have the upport of another parent. 165 In Kentucky,
a "de facto custodian" can secure "the same standing in custody matters
that is given to each parent." 166
On occasion, a state's statutes may recognize residency/hold out and
de facto parents who are neither biologically tied to, nor formal adopters
of, children. 167 For example, the Maine Parentage Act, effective in July
2016, provides for presumed parents who resided with a child from birth
for at least two years and "assumed personal, financial, or custodial
responsibilities," 168 as well as for de facto parents who, inter alia, resided
with the child "for a significant period of time," established with the child
"a bonded and dependent relationship," and "accepted full and permanent
responsibilities as a parent . . . without expectation of financial
compensationO .... " 169 Similarly, there are both residency/hold out and
de facto parent statutes in Delaware 170 Washington, 171 and Vermont. 172

164
DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 8-20l(a)(4), (b)(6), (c) (West 2013) (outlining definitions of
"mother," "father," and the three factors to attain "de facto parent status."). De facto parents
are on equal footing with biological or adoptive parents. See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d
920, 928, 931 (Del. 2011). But see In re Bancroft, 19 A.3d 730, 743 , 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010)
(finding statute overbroad and violative of fit mother's and father's due process rights when
the mother's boyfriend seeks to be a third parent). Cf K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975 (N.J.
Super. C1. pp. Di v. 2014) (determining fom1cr female domestic partner of birth mother has
standing to seek childcare order where birth mother ceded some of her parental authority, but
where adoptive parent had not; former partner must show "exceptional circumstances" per
Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558 (N.J. 2000)).
165
WASH. REV. CODE§ 26.26A.440(4) (2019) (requiring demonstration of requisite
elements by preponderance of the evidence).
166
KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 403.270(l)(a)-(b) (2018); see Kingcade v. Sherwood, 2020
WL 6818440, at *2-3 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2020) (utilizing KY. REV. STAT.§
403 .270(1 )(a)-(b )).
167
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-a, §§ 1881, 1891 (2016).
168
Id.§ 1881(3).
169
Id.§ 1891(3).
110
DEL. CODE tit. 13, §§ 8-201(c) (2013), 8-204(a)(5) (2004) (outlining de facto parent
and presumed residency/hold out parent).
17 1
WASH. REV. CODE§§ 26.26A. l 15(1)(b), 26.26A.440 (2019) (noting presumed
residency/bold out parent "for the first four years" and outlining de facto parent requirements).
112
VT. STAT. tit. 15C, §§ 40 l(a)(4) 50 I (a) (2018) (noting presumed residency/hold out
parent after the first two years and outlining de facto parent requirements).

I
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Beyond statutes, some judicial precedents recognize a form of de
facto parentage without employing the term. 173 In 2008, the South
Carolina Supreme Court adopting a Wisconsin Supreme Court analysis
determined that a nonparent was eligible for psychologica l parent tatu
only after satisfying a four-prong te t. 174 Thi test required that the
petitioning prospective parent how: ( l) the biological or adoptive parent
consented to, and subsequently fostered the petitioner fo1ming and
e tablishing a parent-like relationship with the child· (2) the child and
petitioner concurrently lived in the same household together; (3) the
petitioner assumed parenthood obligation by undertaking ignificant
responsibilities for the child's education development, and care, which
included contributions towards the child' uppm1 without expectating
financ ial compensation; and (4) the petitioner has existed in that parental
role for a ufficient length of time to establish a dependent, bonded, and
parental relationship with the child. 175 In 2009, a federal appeals court
noted that the Missis ippi Supreme Court long recognized that a person
standing "in loco parentis," or "one who has assumed the statu and
obligations of a parent without a formal adoption," has the same "rights,
dutie [ J and liabiJities" as a natural parent. 176
By contrast, in some American states where there are no or limited
de facto parent statutes, courts choose not to develop precedents, even
where they are sympathetic to the pleas for establishing de facto
parentage. 177 In Illinois 178 and elsewhere, 179 high courts have refused to
Beside psychological or in loco parcnlis parenthood, see, for example, KY. REV.
STAT. § 403.270( 1)-(2) (2018) ("de facto cuslodian") (construed in Garvin v. Krieger, 601
S. W.Jd 4 I, 484-85 (Ky. t. App. 2020)).
174
Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 739, 743-44, 747 (S.C. 2008) (following In re
Custody ofH.S.H.-K., 533 N. W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995), which set out nonns for
nonparent child visitation orders); see also Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 446-47 (Md.
2016) (recognizing de facto parent doctrine by utilizing 111 re Custody ofH.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2d419 (Wis. 1995)).
175
Marquez, 656 S.E.2d at 743-44.
176
First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 555 F.3d 177, 183 (5th ir. 2009) (relying on,
inter alia, and quo1ing Farve v. Medders 128 o.2d 877, 879 (Miss. 1961 )); see also
ehnedler v. Lee, 445 P.3d 238, 243 (Okla. 2019) (addressing "in loco parenlis" and
elaborating on Ramey v. S111to11, 362 P.3d 217 (Okla. 2015)).
177
See, e.g. , In re Parentage of carleu Z.D., 28 N.E.3d 776 789- 90 (Ill. 2015).
178
Id. al 790 (noting that, while there i a need for a 'comprehensive . . . olution," ii
must come from the legislature).
179
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, State lawmaking on Federal Constitutional Childcare
Purents: More Principled Allocations ofPowers and More Rational Distinctions, 50
CREIGHTON L. REV. 479, 495- 504(2017) ( urvcying multiple tatcs). Other recent authority
includes C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 92-93 910- 11 (Pa. 20 l S)(denying standing but
recognizing that " in loco parcnti "standing to pursue custody i avai lable to a nonparent). A
17J
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act because they deem any new de facto parentage norms to be the
responsibility of state legislators. 180
Whether in statutes or precedents, de facto childcare parentage (or
some form thereof) sometimes arises in American states without the actual
consent or apparent consent-per the ALI Torts Draft No. 4--of an
existing legal parent (like a voluntary acknowledged parent or a spousal
parent), or without the knowledge of an expecting legal parent (like an
unwed biological father). 181 The 2017 UPA condones such de facto
parentage, noting that only "another parent" needs to foster or support the
de facto parent's dependent relationship.182 Likewise, the 2019 ALI Draft
requires "a parent" to consent to the de facto parent's "formation of the
parent-child relationship." 183 The fostering or consenting parent in the
2017 UPA and 2019 ALI Draft, incidentally, cannot rescind consent when
the petitioning alleged de facto parent seeks a childcare order. 184
G. Childcare Opportunities for Genetic Donors in Formal
Adoption Cases
There are some federal constitutional protections of childcare
opportunities for the noncustodial genetic donors of nonmarital children
court found such standing in C.L.A. v. P.K., 2020 WL 1245127, at* I (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 16,
2020). For a forceful argument on the need for continuing the common law "equitable
parenthood doctrine," even where there are statutes, see generally Jessica Feinberg, Whither
the Functional Parent? Revisiting Equitable Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex
Parents' increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55
(2017).
180
Similarly, one may not pursue common law marriage precedents where statutes
already address varying forms of actual and putative spouses. See, e.g., in re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning D.P.G., 472 P.3d 567, 569, 571 (Colo. App. 2020) (concluding
no common law marriage where clements of putative spouse statute, COLO. REV. STAT.§ 142-1 I I, have not been met).
181
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS§ 16(a)
(AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019).
l82
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609(d)(6) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
183
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW§ l.82(a)(4) (AM. LAW.
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019); see also, e.g., E.N. v. T.R., 236 A.3d 670, 672, 677 n.11
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2020) (noting only one legal parent needs to consent and foster a de facto
parent, though also acknowledging in footnote eleven an arguable "implied consent by the
second legal parent); Schaedler v. Lee, 445 P.3d 238, 243 (Okla. 2019) (stating acquiescence
and encouragement by sperm donor of a parental-like relationship between a child and the
birth mother's same sex partner is unnecessary, even when donor "alleged he had maintained
some relationship-albeit minimal and covert."); Lanfear v. Ruggerio, 2020 WL 6107218, at
*3 (Vt. Oct. 16, 2020) (determining that a biological father and birth mother of a child born of
sex seemingly consented to at least some parental-like acts of third person).
184
See, e.g., R.M. v. T.A., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836, 849-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
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whose custodial parents place them for formal adoption. 185 Such donors
include men whose consensual sex with birth mothers prompted the births
of the children, as well as women whose eggs prompted births of children
to custodial mothers who earlier agreed to coparent with the donors. 186
The constitutional protections spring from the United States Supreme
Court's 1983 in Lehr v. Robertson. 187 There, the six-justice majority
opined that a state statutory adoption scheme could not likely "omit many
responsible fathers" of children born of consensual sex to unwed mothers
who placed the children for adoption, as such genetic parents had parental
opportunity interests. 188 Some lower courts have extended this ruling to
women whose eggs prompted births of nonmarital children over whom
the donors and birth mothers intended to coparent. 189
Omissions of genetic donors from formal adoption proceedings do,
unfortunately, occur. 190 Such omissions sometimes result in innocent
losses of protected childcare opportunities or, more significantly, of
childcare rights involving "care, custody, and control." 191 One can easily
imagine such omissions under the following Utah statute:
The Legislature finds that an unmarried mother has a right of privacy with regard
to her pregnancy and adoption plan, and therefore has no legal obligation to
disclose the identity of an unmarried biological father prior to or during an
adoption proceeding, and has no obligation to volunteer information to the court
with respect to the father. 192

The legislature deems necessary the losses for a biological parent
who is not married to the birth mother in order to promote "the interests
185
There arc often greater, though not absolute, protections afforded to noncustodial
genetic donors of marital children, as here, spousal parentage presumptions usually operate.
See, e.g., In re Adoption of A.C.B., 159 Ohio St.3d 256, 255-56 (Ohio 2020) (noting former
husband's failure to provide sufficient child support in last year made his consent to
stepparent adoption was non-essential).
186
See D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 327-28 (Fla. 2013).
187
Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). There may be further constitutional
protections under familial association precedents. See, e.g., Wagner v. Spokane, 2020 WL
7241056, slip op. at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 9, 2020) (requiring removal of children from
parental custody before one may assert associational rights).
188
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261--{;4.
189
See, e.g., D.M T., 129 So. 3d at 327-28 (Fla. 2013) (also relying on due process and
privacy protections within the Florida constitution).
190
See, e.g., Malinda L. Seymore, Grasping Fatherhood in Abortion and Adoption, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 817, 822 (2017)(discussing unwed fathers).
191
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (recognizing fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning "the care, custody, and control of their children.").
192
UTAH CODE§ 788-6-102(7) (2019). Identical findings are made in IDAHO CODE§
16-1501A(4) (current through 2020).
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of the state, the mother, the child, and the adoptive parents," as they
"outweigh the interest of an unmarried biological father who does not
timely grasp the opportunity to establish and demonstrate a relationship
with his child. ' 193 Where a father's failure to grasp is caused by "fraud or
misrepresentation '' 194 the statute deems that father to be "in the best
position to prevent or ameliorate the effects of fraud" and thus "the burden
of fraud [is] borne by him." 195 The father can overcome fraud only by
registering with the putative father registry, including instances where his
female sex partner expressed that she was incapable of conceiving. The
possible father would need to stalk his former sex partner to make sure his
parentage interests are protected. 196 Similarly there are burdens on an egg
donor when a same-sex. fi male couple conceives a child as do-ityourselfers.1 97 Seemingly, the female donor would perJ1aps need to sign
up with the putative father registry or file a maternity case.
More significantly, some unwed biological fathers and some egg
donors who did eize their parental opportunity interests tmder Lehr-by
being an intended parent via an assisted reproduction contract, a de facto
parent, or a hold out/residency parent-may remain unknown to the
adoption court in Utah (and elsewhere). The Utah provision providing for
"no obligation to volunteer information" does not distinguish between,
biological parents who did or did not seize their parental opportunity
interests in certain ways. 198 By contrast, "right of privacy"
notwithstanding, adoption proceedings involving a then "unmarried
mother" will Likely result in revelations of that mother's earlier marriage
during pregnancy or at the time of birth.
Outside of Utah, other states also likely omit some actual or
prospective childcare parents from formal adoption proceedings. These
states may do so by not prompting custodial parents placing children for
adoption to make voluntary disclosures of presumed spousal parents,
intended parents in assisted reproduction settings, or genetic donors who
UTAH CODE§ 788-6-102(6)(c) (2019).
Id. § 788-6-102(6)(d).
Id.; see also id.§ 788-6-102(6)(e) (noting that "[a]n unmarried biological father has
primary responsibility to protect his rights.").
l9 6
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Art. 4 cmt. (UNIF. LAWCOMM'N 2017) (discussing
putative father registries and constitutionality).
197
For an egg donor, there is no clear and explicit recognition of a putative mother
registry or a putative parent registry under Utah statutes. See UTAH CODE§ 788-6-120(l)(e)
(2019) (mandating consent to adoption of"biological parent" who executed a "voluntary
declaration of paternity"); see also id. § 788-6-121.5 (compact for interstate sharing of
putative father registry information).
19s
Id. § 788-6-102(7).
193

194
19 5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3750288

308

QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:275

have actually child-cared or who planned to do so. Omissions arise when
states fail to undertake any independent searches designed to reveal actual
child caretakers who may be existing or expecting legal parents. t 99 Of
course, any searche must account for the privacy rights of those
interested in any pos ible adoption. 200
Possible losses of childcare interests by biological parents, spousal
parents, intended parents, and others can be mitigated by greater
recognitions of the governmental need, pre-adoption, to encourage
(existing or expecting) parentage information revelations by birth
mothers, and/or to undertake independent investigations into the actual or
possible legal childcare interests of those not then present who are either
expecting (i.e., potential) or existing legal parents.201
Employing a higher standard of review on appeal in adoption order
challenges can also foster mitigation of such losses. 202 Mitigation can be
faci litated where at least limited post-adoption challenges to earlier
adoptions, while sometimes quite disruptive, are available. 203 Where postadoption challenges involving intentional (and perhaps grossly negligent)
conduct by individual adoption petitioners, adoption centers, or
governmental agents can prompt remedies like damage rather than
undoing earl ier adoptions, 204 there are incentive for improvement in pre199
Expecting or existing legal parentage can also arise, for example, under de facto
parent laws. ee discussion supra cction 11.F.
zoo Those interested in possible adoptions include not onl.y expecting or existing legal
parents, but also the children themselves, those ruled out as parents, siblings, and other
c tablished or possible family members (like grnndparcL1ts.. especially if they arc custodians or
guardians of the children who ore placed for adoption). See RES'rATeMENT Of' TH E LAW:
CMILDREN AND TH E LAW§ 1.80 cmi. a (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Oran No. 2, 20 l 9)
(di cussing grandpurcntnl sibling, and other third-party interests in contact with a child).
20 1
See Jeffrey A. Parness. Federal Co11sti111tio11al Childcare Parems, 90 ST. JOHN 'S L.
REV . 965 972 (2016) (discussing federal protection of and legislation regarding opportunity
interests).
wi Ccmpare, e.g., K.H. v. M.M., I 51 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (lncl. Ct. App. 2020) (noting
adoption ruling will nol be disturbed "unless the evidence leads to bul one conclusion and the
trial judge reached an opposite conclusion,• essentially, a "clcarl.y erroneous" standard) (citing
In re Adoption ofT.L., 4 N.E.Jd 658, 662 (lnd. 2014); E.B.F. v. D.F. , 93 N.R.3d 759, 762
(Ind. 2018)), with rebs v. Stale, 474 P.3cl I 136, l 142 (Wyo. 2002) (noting alleged
con litulional speedy criminal trial right violations arc reviewed de novo) and Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 564 U . . 552, 566 (2011) ("The First Amcndm.ent requires heightened scrutiny
whenever the government create 'a rcgttlation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.").
203
Mitigation of these possible lo scs al o occurs when courts require satisfoction ofan
independent test involving a child' s best interests before judicial approval of an adoption
petition. See, e.g. , /11 re Adoption ofK.S., 980 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
204
See, e.g .• Pci1a v. Mattox, 4 F.3d 894, 896, 899- 90 I (7th Cir. 1996) (rccogniiing
slate laws, though not federal constitutional law, may bestow " parental rights" on genetic
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adoption processes which invite innocent losses of protected parental
interests. Courts may also enjoin processes that likely systematically
"omit" responsible genetic parents under the Lehr requirement on parental
opportunity interests. 205
Changes in the last half century regarding Florida adoption notice
laws that govern the existing and expecting parental interests of unwed
genetic fathers of children born of consensual sex demonstrate the
variations in statutory protections against innocent losses of parentage or
parentage opportunity interests. 206
A half century ago, "genetic fathers who were unmarried to the
mothers of their children had few opportunities in Florida to participate in
adoption proceedings."207 Florida courts found that a "genetic father's
consent to adoption (often sought by the mother's [then] husband) [was]
unnecessary even when the [genetic] father had made voluntary child
support payments."208
After 1975 the legi lature expanded genetic fathers' rights to
participate in adoption cases involving their nonmarital children. 209 From
then until 2001, courts required, unless explicitly excused, post-birth
written consent from fathers who established paternity through court
proceedings,2 10 signed and filed acknowledgments of paternity,211 or
"provided child support" in a customary and repetitive manner. 2 12
Legislative initiatives in 2001 expanded adoption participation rights
to incorporate potential genetic fathers who " attempted to provide' such
consistent support during the mother's pregnancy." 213 Moreover, and
notably, the legislature "extended participation rights to men" who birth

fathers that can prompt damage recoveries for parentage opportunity losses, perhaps even for
a statutory rapist as the man who sued in the case).
20 5
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983).
206
See Jeffrey A. Parness, Adoption Notices to Genetic Fathers: No to Scarlett Letters,
Yes to Good-Faith Cooperation, 36 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 63, 70-76 (2005) (reviewing in
more detail the Florida changes since 1975).
207
id. at 71.
20s
id.; see also Clements v. Banks, 159 So. 2d 892, 892-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)
(holding that prior voluntary support of an illegitimate child did not give standing to the
putative father to contest adoption of the child by the mother's husband).
209
Parness, supra note 206, at 72.
210
Id. (citing FLA. STAT.§ 63.062(1) (1997) (amended 2001)).
21 1
Id. (citing FLA. STAT.§ 63.062(l)(b)(4) (1997) (amended 2001)).
2 12
Id. (citing FLA. STAT.§ 63.062(1), (l)(b)(4), (l)(b)(5) (1997) (amended 2001)).
2 13
Parness, supra note 206, at 72 (quoting FLA. STAT.§ 63.062(l)(d)(2) (2001)
(amended 2003); citing Act of Apr. 18, 2001, ch. 3, § 3, 2001 Fla. Laws 5, 8).
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mothers reasonably "identified" as possible genetic fathers to their
children. 214
As of 2001 , in cases where courts did not know the name or location
of those men from whom they required consent to adoption, like those
" identified ' as potential fathers a judge would question the mothers and
their relatives at adoption hearings. 2 15 The judges inquired regarding ' men
who provided or promised to provide support, men with whom the
mothers cohabited at the time of conception, and men that the mothers had
'reason to believe' could be the genetic fathers." 216 Adoption entities also
undertook, if needed, "diligent" searches to determine the location of
identified men. 217 If men remained unidentified or with an unknown
location upon inquiry, Florida law further required the adoption entity or
mother to notify the men by publishing a notice "in newspapers in
counties where 'conception may have occurred,' where the mothers
reside, and where the men whom the mothers believe might be the genetic
fathers reside."218 Legislation also required within the notice "physical
description of the genetic mothers and pos ible genetic fathers, including
information on 'age race hair[,] and eye color' as well as 'height and
weight. "'2 19 These notice al o needed to contain the dates and cities
where conception "'may have occurred[,]"' as well as the children's birth
dates. 220
The so-called "Scarlett Letter" laws on publication notice took effect
on October 1, 2001. 221 Only some of the provisions faced attacks for lack
of constitutionality with respect to informational privacy in May of
2002. 222 Among the challenged provis ion were the requirements for
published notices to missing fathers.223 A Palm Beach County circuit

2 14
215

2003)).
2 16
217

2003)).
2 18
2 19
220
221

Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 63 .062(l)(d)(5) (2001) (amended 2003)).
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 63.088(3) (2001) (internal quotations omitted) (amended
Id. (quoting FLA. TAT. § 63.088(3)(e), (d), (g) (2001) (amended 2003)).
Parness, supra note 206, at 72 (citing FLA. STAT.§ 63 .088(4) (2001) (amended
Id. at 72-73 (c iting FLA. STAT. § 63 .088(5) (200 l) (amended 2003)).
Id. at 73 (citing FLA. STAT. § 63.088(5) (2001) (amended 2003)).
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 63.088(5) (2001) (amended 2003)).
Parness, supra note 206 at 73 (citing Act o f Apr. 18, 2001 ch. 3, § 17, 2001 Fla.

Sess. Law 5, 6 1: H.R . 141 , 2001 Leg., 17th Reg. Sc-ss. (Fla. 200 1): Mess-age from Jcb Bush,
Governor of Florida, lo Katherine Harris, Florida Secretary of State (Apr. 17, 200 I)).
222
Id. (citing G.P. v. State, 842 So.2d 1059 , 106 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), whicb
invalidated FLA. STAT.§§ 63 .087 and 63 .088 (2001 ), commonly kn own as the "Scarlett
Letter" provisions).
223

Id.
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judge denied relief at the trial level. 224 The Palm Beach judge found the
provisions "served compelling governmental interests with no less
intrusive means available to achieve those interests." 225
A Florida appeals court then invalidated the provisions on
publication notice in 2003,226 finding the Florida constitutional privacy
right encompasses individual interests in both "avoiding disclosures of
personal matters and in making certain important decisions
independently."227 Determining the invasion of these interests to be
"patent," the court refrained from performing a constitutional analysis of
Florida's privacy right. 228 The appeals court held that the state did not
meet its burden to justify the "personal, intimate, and intrusive" nature of
constructive notice provisions,229 and explicitly declined to address
whether "alternative proposals" for notification by publication to genetic
fathers could meet this burden. 230
Shortly after the 2003 ruling, Florida lawmakers unanimously
established the "Florida Putative Father Registry," 231 whose stated
purpose was "to preserve the right to notice and consent to an
adoption."232 If a man believed he could be a genetic father, under the new
law, he must register with the state-233 specifically including the name,
address, and physical description of the potential mother, as well as the
date and location where conception could have occurred. 234 A man could
thereby "preserve the right to notice and consent to ... adoption" if the
woman named in the registry placed a baby up for adoption. 235 The man
may also file a "claim of paternity ... at any time before the child's

224
Id. (citing G.P., 842 So.2d at 1061 and noting the trial judge "did find the statutes
were unconstitutional as to women whose pregnancy was a result of sexual battery.") (internal
quotations omitted).
225
Parness, supra note 206, at 73 (citing G.P., 842 So.2d at 1061).
226
Id. (citing G.P., 842 So.2d at 1060-61).
221
Id. (citing G.P., 842 So.2d at 1062).
22s
Id. (citing G.P., 842 So.2d at 1062).
229
Parness, supra note 206, at 73-74 (interna; quotations omitted) (quoting G.P., 842
So.2d at 1063).
2 3°
Id. at 74 (internal quotations omitted) (citing G.P., 842 So.2d at 1063, which states
'"[w]e do not address' the validity ofa more narrowly drawn statute.").
231
Id. (citing FLA. STAT.§ 63.054 (2003)); see also FLA. STAT.§ 63.054 (2020).
232
FLA. STAT.§ 63 .054(1) (2014).
233
Id.
234
Id. § 63 .054(3).
235
FLA. STAT. § 63.054(1).
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birth."236 A man could not register, however, if the mother had already
begun the requisite legal proce s to terminate the man' parental rights. 237
The Florida "paternity registry law effectively denie[ d] parent[ age]
opportunities to many fit genetic fathers[,] ... even though other laws
continue to expose these same men to child support" obligations "long
after birth and . . . any significant chance for developing a meaningful
parent-child relationship."238 Importantly, the 2003 paternity registry law
stated:
An unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that he has engaged in a
sexual relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy
and an adoption proceeding regarding that child may occur and that he has a
duty to protect his own rights and interest. He is, therefore, entitled to notice of
a birth or adoption proceeding with regard to that child only as provided in this
chapter. 239

In accordance with this change, the law eradicated the judicial
inquiries requirement into, and meticulous adoption entity searches for,
"any man who the mother has reason to believe may be the father ... and
who ... [h]as been identified by the birth mother as a person she has
reason to believe may be the father ... "-which was included in the 2001
version of the statute. 240
The judicial system and the public could more easily discover the
identities of potential genetic fathers of children placed for adoption
before 2003. 24 L The 2001 statute required that those who petitioned to
terminate parental rights pending adoption act in "good faith," and that
"diligent efforts"242 be undertaken to find the men identified by the
236

Id.

Id.
Parness, supra note 206, at 7 75. See generally, e.g., In re Ramos v. Brodorck, 8
N.Y.S.3d 204, 204 (N .Y. App. Div. 2018) (h !ding that no equitable cstoppel defense existed
for an unwed biological father because the child did not form a close relationship with the
mother's former or current husbands, and therefore the best interests of the child arc served by
adjudicating the defendant as the child's father); In re Lozaldo v. Cri tando, 83 N. Y .S .3d 21 l,
211 (N. Y. App. Div. 2018) (holding that an unwed biological father needed to maintain his
life insurance policy to fulfill his child support obligations); see also Jeffrey A. Parness &
Matthew Timko, De Facto Parent and Nonparent Child Support Orders, 67 AM. U. L. REV.
769, 798 (2018).
239
Parness, supra note 206, at 75 (quoting Act of May 30, 2003, ch. 58, § 18, 2003 Fla.
Laws 455, 496-97); Act of May 30, 2003, ch. 2003-58, 2003 Fla. Scss. Law Scrv. I, 27
(West).
240
FLA. STAT.§ 63.062(l)(d)(3) (West 2003) (amended May 30, 2003).
241
Parness, supra note 206, at 75.
24 2
FLA. STAT.§ 63 .062(6) (2003) (amended May 30, 2003).
2J1

2.38
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mothers as the potential fathers. 243 Under the 2003 law, only unmarried
genetic fathers who had already taken affirmative steps to claim potential
parental right by obtaining a judicial declaration of paternity, 244 or by
officially recognizing or claiming patemity,245 called for • diligent"
searches. 246 Likewise, since 2003 courts neces itated an unmarried
genetic father provide consent to adoption only if he stepped up in the
aforementioned way and developed a ubstantial" relationship with bis
child247 or' demonsb:ated a full commitment" to parental respoosibility. 248
Under the 2003 law, an unmarried genetic father, unaware of the
child's conception or existence but retaining the duty to protect his own
interests and rights, may ' file a notarized claim of paternity form with the
Florida Putative Father Registry maintained by the Office of Vital
Statistics of the Department of Health" in order to step up to possible
parenthood. 249 The Depa1tment typically maintains uch fmms in
confidence. Under current law, when adoptions are pursued, there is a
judicial inquiry and diligent search for a potential genetic father in
accordance witb tatute. 250 The genetic father is accountable for failing to
comply with the filing requirement even if the mother's misrepresentation
or deceitful act caused his failure to file. 25 l The 2003 law also provided
that, in cases where a parent or the state p laces a newborn child under six
months old with "adoptive parents,' an unmarried genetic father mu t
have in order to participate in adoption proceedings filed a notarized
claim of paternity form "prior to the time the mother executes her consent
for adoption. 252 Since an unwed genetic mother can con ent to adoption
forty-eight hours after giving birth, or on the day she Learns 'she is fit to
be released from the Licensed ho pital or bi11h center,''253 the Jaw leaves
little time for a genetic father to step up to claim parental rigbts. 254

243
See id.§ 63.062(1)-(6). But see FLA. STAT.§ 63 .087(4)(d) (2012) (incorporating the
same requirements).
244
FLA. STAT.§ 63.062(l)(b)(3 ) (2012).
245
Id. § 63 .062(l)(b)(4)-{5) (requiring genetic fathers to file an affidavit or
acknowledgement).
246
id.§ 63.087(3)(b) (2012).
247
Id. § 63.062(2)(a).
248
FLA. STAT.§ 63.062(2)(a) (discussing children less than six months old who are
placed for adoption).
249
id.§ 63.054(1) (2014).
250
Id.§ 63 .088(4)-{5) (West 2012).
251
Parness, supra note 206, at 76.
252
FLA. STAT.§ 63 .062(2)(b) (2012).
25)
id.§ 63.082(4)(b) (2016).
254
Parness, supra note 206, at 76.
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"Undeniably, the 2001 Scarlett Letter provisions regarding
constructive notices to persons reasonably believed to be potential genetic
fathers were excessive[;]"255 yet, there were 'alternative proposals" 256
outside of a paternity registry that could have accomplished the legitimate
governmental interests in facilitating parentage for fathers. Further, there
are means of notifying potential genetic fathers that do not present
significant consequences of "personal, intimate, and intrusive"
performance of such notifications. 257
Florida lawmakers had good reason in 2003 to require searches for,
and notices to, genetic fathers when unmarried mothers placed newborn
children up for adoption. 258 All potential and actual genetic fathers are not
alike. 259 Consider the men in the Scarlett Letter case: allegedly, one male
was a twenty-seven-year-old statutory rapist, 260 and others included three
men who slipped a date rape drug to a thirty-something-year-old single
woman. 261 None of these males, assuming the allegations to be true, had
paternity interests that would trigger judicial inquiries, much less diligent
earches. 262 By contrast seven other men in the Scarlett Letter ca e simply
had ex at different times with a single woman in her twenties.26'.l A few
others, at worst, used drugs and engaged in sex with a single woman in
her late twenties who, herself, "had an on again, off again drug
problem. " 264 At least some of these men, when identified, merited a
chance to express an interest in chi ldcare and to seek the fotmation of a
meaningful parent-child relationship with their genetic offspringespecially since they remained responsible for providing child support
should no adoptions occur.
H

Childcare Opportunities in Safe Haven Cases

Not unlike formal adoption laws, state laws regarding safe havens
also prompt infringements of the protected childcare opportunities for
255

Id. at 76.
See G.P. v. State, 842 So.2d 1059, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
257
Sec id.
258
Parness, supra note 206, at 76.
259
Id. at 76-77.
260
See Jennafer Neufeld & Dalia Georgi, In Re: Adoption of a Minor Child- Circuit
Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, 11 AM. U . J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 1199, 1203 (2003) (reviewing G.P. v. State, 842 So.2d 1059).
261
See id. at 1204.
262
Parness, supra note 206, at 77.
263
Neufeld & Georgi, supra note 260, at 1204, 1204 n.35.
264
See id. at 1204.
25 6
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genetic donors. 265 Although written in general, neutral tenns, many state
laws now effectively pennit birth mothers to olely undertake the
abandonment of newborn .266 These acts foreclose, without notice or a
chance to be heard, any legal parenthood for the intended parents under a
valid surrogacy agreement; for genetic fathers or moth.ers who are fit and
willing to parent their intended children born of non-surrogacy as isted
reproduction; for genetic fathers who 1·egistered with putative father
regi tries; or for genetic fathers who otherwise exhibited a desire to parent
any children bom of consensual sex with the genetic mother. 267 Legal
parenthood would be lost, even for some who are federal constitutional
childcare parents, as through spousal parent presumptions or earlier prebfrth and/or post-birth de facto parentchildcaring. Bil1h mother can walk
away from parental support responsibilities early in a child's life. Laws
generally forbid comparable desertions by genetic donors in cases where
tlle birth mothers maintain custody 268 as well as for some birth fathers
when their parental rights are terminated when their children are older in
age.269
Enabling American state statutory provisions following the 1999
"Baby Moses" law in Texas 270 are frequently deemed "Safe Haven" (or
265
See Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, l 06
COLUM. L. REV. 753, 791 (2006) (discussing the disadvantages of Safe Haven laws, including
the birth mother's ability to give up a child without the father's knowledge); see also Jeffrey
A. Parness, Lost Paternity in the Culture of Motherhood: A Different View of Sqfe Haven
Laws, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 81, 86 (2007) ("However, Safe Haven Laws clearly advance the
culture of motherhood . . . that women can terminate the childrearing and paternity
opportunity interests of men, both before and after birth.").
266
See Parness supra note 265, at 85 (providing examples of state statutes which do
not require the birth mother to disclose the identity of the genetic father when abandoning a
child).
267
See id. (descdbing explicit examples of uch applicable statutes).
268
ee, e.g., .E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 834, 836 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
genetic father's ''child support requirements occur without regard to [his] wishes or his
emotional attachment to his offapring," and he could not "escape responsibility," even though
he alleged the mother' ' fraudulently induced' sexual intercourse" by lying about her u c of
birth control and "then le11 the slate, married another man, and delayed ccking child support
for several years a11er birth.")· see also /11 re T.M . . v. Stale, 52 P. 3d 934, 935, 938 (Nev.
2002) (holding that there was no termina(ion of financial responsibilities for II genetic father
where the child was a teenager and the father abandoned her long ago and lhc child's b ·t
interest. were thus 1.:rvcd because she may later benefit from financial aid, including her
father's reimbursement, of a state welfare agency for money it hnd provided).
269
See, e.g. Stale v. Fritz, 0 l A.2d 679. 688 (R.I. 2002) (holding that a genetic
father' financial obligations did not automatically cease upon the termination of his parental
right ). C-Omra State Dep't of Muman Res. ex rel. Overstreet v. Overstreet, 78 P.3d 95 I, 956
(Okla. 2003) (holding that a father's parental duties, including his fi.nancial support
obligati.ons ceased once his parental rights were lerminntcd).
110
TEX. FAM . CODE § 262.301 (2001).
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"Safe Haven Infant Protection") laws. 271 Lawmakers typically justify
these laws on child protection grounds. They often guarantee the
caretakers of ce11ain newborns both anonymity and immunity from
prosecution for cb.ild abandonment. 272 Safe Haven laws do, however, vary
widely from state to state.m The laws differ on certain issues, such as
which children may be left (e.g., younger than three days, younger than
thirty days, abused children, etc.); where children may be left (e.g.,
hospitals only, at a police or fire station, etc.); who may leave children
(e.g., genetic parent only, any person with lawful custody, etc.); and the
procedures for receiving children (e.g., anonymity always, whether
questions may be asked by the recipients to the person surrendering the
child, etc.). 274
While there is much variation, most state Safe Haven provisions
effectively permit abandonment of very young children by birth mothers
without requiring the mothers to reveal much, if anything, about the actual
or presumed (as with spouses) genetic donors. 275 Notably, the birth mother
also does not need to reveal information about other potentially involved
parties, including those who provided childcare earlier or who planned to
provide childcare with the birth mothers, as through non-surrogacy
assisted reproduction pacts. 276 Abandoning birth mothers also do not need
to reveal any pre-birth arrangements on future childcare by future
nongenetic, but intended, parents, as through surrogacy pacts277 or
assisted reproduction pacts.278

271

2021).

Safe Haven Laws , USLEGAL, https://safehavenlaws.uslegal.com (last visited Feb. 4,

Id.
Id.
274
See id.
275
See USLEGAL, supra note 271 .
2 76
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 703 (UNIF. LAWCOMM'N 2017) ("An individual who
consents ... to assisted reproduction by a woman with the intent to be a parent of a child
conceived by the assisted re production is a parent of the child.").
211
Gestational surrogates (which involve no egg- donation) and genetic surrogates
(which involve an egg donation) may have different post-birth rights involving child
abandonmenL See, e.g., id. § 808(a) ("A party to a gcslational surrogacy agreement may
terminate the agreement, at any time be fore an embryo transfer, by g iving notice ... to all
other parties."); see also id. § 814(a)(l)--(2) (stating an intended parent to a geneti c surrogacy
agreement " may terminate the agreement at any time before a gamete or embryo transfer" and
permitting a genetic surrogate to withdraw consent at any time before seventy-two hours after
the birth).
27 8
See id. § 707(a) ("An individual who consents .. . to assisted reproduction may
withdraw consent any time before a transfer that results in a pregnancy(] . .. .").
272

213
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Lost parents need not be alleged rapists or deadbeats for the Safe
Haven laws to operate. 279 The parents may be married men with genetic
ties and positive feelings about fatherhood; women married to birth
mothers, including those with genetic ties who undertook valid assisted
reproduction pacts; or women or men who had planned with expecting
birth mothers, through surrogacy pacts, to parent later-born children. In
most instances, the identities of genetic donors, or intended parents, will
be undiscoverable. 280
A Wisconsin statute, for example, states that when a birth mother
relinquishes child custody and there is no evidence of abuse or neglect,
"[n]o person may induce or coerce or attempt to induce or coerce a parent
... who wishes to remain anonymous into revealing ... her identity." 281
A West Virginia statute declares that a hospital taking possession of an
abandoned child from a parent' may not require the person to identify
himself or herselfand shall otherwi e respect the person's desire to remain
anonymous."282 A New Mexico statute is omewhat sympathetic to lost
parents, but ultimately provides little practical help. The New Mexico
statute tate : "A safe haven site may a k the person leaving th infant for
the name of the infant's biological father[,] . .. the infant's name[,] and
the infant's medical history, but the person leaving the infant is not
required to provide that information to the safe haven site."283 Finally, a
South Carolina statute declares that a safe haven must ask the person
leaving the infant for medical information contained on a form provided
by the Department of Social Services; 284 however, an accompanying
subsection also declares that "[t]he person leaving the infant is not
required to disclose his or her identity."285
A few state Safe Haven laws initially appear quite sympathetic to
lost parents. In Florida, the statutory procedures regarding women who
abandon newborns grant to lost parents some opportunitie to void earlier
parental rights terminations or adoptions within one year if "the court
fmds that a person knowingly gave false information that prevented the
parent from timely making known his or her desire to assume parental
re ponsibilities toward the minor or from exercising his or her parental
27 9
See Parness, supra note 206, at 76-77 ("[A]II potential and actual genetic fathers are
not alike.").
280
Id. at 75.
281
WIS. STAT.§ 48.195(2) (2018).
282
W. VA. CODE§ 49-4-201(b) (2020) .
283
N.M. STAT.§ 24-22-3(8) (2013).
284
S.C. CODE§ 63-7-40(B)(3) (2016).
285
Id.§ 63-7-40(A).
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rights."286 There is also, however, a Florida Safe Haven provision which
declares that, "[ e]xcept where there is actual or suspected child abuse or
neglect, any parent who leaves a newborn infant . . . and expresses an
intent to leave . . . and not return, has the absolute right to remain
anonymous and to leave at any time" and to "not be pursued or
followed." 287 Thus, Florida laws often provide no practical opportunities
for diligent searches so that the childcare interests of genetic donors, or
other intended parents, of the very young are not lost.
By contrast to Florida Safe Haven laws, when birth mothers place
minor children for adoption in Florida, proceedings to terminate all
parental rights in anticipation of an adoption requires judicial inquiries
into, and adoption entity searches for, genetic donors and any non-donor
parents. 288 The subjects of these due diligence explorations once included
those persons who were married to the birth mothers, who were previously
judicially deemed childcare or adopted parents, who acknowledged or
claimed parentage through voluntary acknowledgment processes, and
who cohabitated with the birth mothers. 289
Safe Haven laws need such due diligence explorations with adequate
privacy protections. These explorations should also encompass, given
advances in assisted reproduction technologies, those who were intended
parents of children born via assisted reproduction through either
surrogacy or non-surrogacy pacts.
These due diligence explorations should be compelled in advance in
many Safe Haven instances, as where, under Lehr v. Robertson, the
governmental schemes will likely systematically "omit" many responsible
genetic parents who are expecting, or existing, legal parents. 29° Certain
failures to provide such due diligence might prompt monetary remedies
for some genetic parents, 291 causing failursd to be deterred.

FLA. STAT.§ 63.0423(9)(a) (2012).
Id.§ 383.50(5).
288
See id.§ 63.088(2), (5).
289
FLA. STAT.§ 63.088(4) (amended 2008).
29°
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983).
291
See, e.g., Dees v. Cty. of San Diego, 960 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding
that an "actual loss of custody" must be proven in a Fourteenth Amendment claim by parents
seeking money damages where a minor child has been separated from their parents by state
actors).
286
287
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MITIGATING INNOCENT LOSSES OF PARENTAGE RIGHTS

Eliminating, or dramatically reducing, the chances for innocent
losses of constitutional rights, must be pursued. Generally, there should
be no losses for those who did not act directly, indirectly, or apparently in
ways that justify the losses. Further, instances where fundamental rights
are at stake warrant greater protections against innocent losses.
Parentage laws involving de facto status, formal adoption, and Safe
Haven child placement demonstrate both the lack of justification for
certain innocent losses of parental rights, as well as the need for enhanced
protections for established parenthood as compared to anticipated
parenthood. In the three parentage settings, innocent losses may befall
established (existing) legal parents, or anticipated (expecting) legal
parents with federal constitutional rights encompassing the care, custody,
and control of their children. 292 In these settings, there may be losses for
those who undertook no direct, indirect, or apparent action in ceding
parental power. 293
Protections against innocent losses of parental rights should
differentiate between possible losses by existing legal parents and
expecting legal parents. Existing legal parents, albeit usually defined by
U.S. state laws, possess federal constitutional rights regarding the care,
custody, and control of their children294 under U.S. Supreme Court
precedents, including Troxel v. Granville. 295 Expecting legal parents
possess federal constitutional parentage opportunity interests in
establishing existing legal parentage under U.S. Supreme Court
precedents, including Lehr v. Robertson. 296 Such expecting parents, as
with semen or egg donors, include those genetically tied to future or
current children. 297 Expecting parents may also include those with no
genetic ties who intend, through assisted reproduction pacts, to parent

See discussion supra Section II G-H.
See discussion supra Part II.
294
See generally Parness, supra note 201 (explaining that parentage can exist, or be
established, under law without formal governmental recognition, as when de facto parent
status is later recognized due to earlier parental-like acts).
295
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that a Washington law
allowing a non-parent third party to petition childcare visitations was unconstitutional and
violated a parent's fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and
control of their children).
296
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267- 68 (holding that a genetic father who failed to establish a
relationship with his child may lose parentage rights afforded by the law).
297
Parness, supra note 57, at 431.
292
29 3
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future children, as well as those who intend, through de facto parent pacts,
to parent current children. 298
Common authority cases in the Fourth Amendment arena differ from
parentage cases. In Fourth Amendment search ca es, there exists pacts on
reciprocal powers regarding third party acces to property though the
pacts are often only implicit.299 Shared parental childcare between two
ex.i ting or expecting legal parents however u ually does not prompt
similar pacts, or ri k as umptions, involving the possible consequences
for parentage due to the unilateral acts by one of two parents. 300
Like the notion of common authority in the Fourth Amendment
arena, the notion of presumed consent in intentional tort cases should not
extend to innocent losse of parental rights. Such presumed c nsent in to1t
cases i justified only wber there is a 'minor" invasion of privacy. 301
Losses of parentage interests for either existing or expecting legal
parents, involve major privacy invasions.3°2 These invasion are quite
distinct from shoulder tap or handholds on first dates, however
uninvited. 303
Similarly the notion of quasi-contract should not extend to im1ocent
losses of parentage rights. The pousal nece sity doctrine is not unlike the
pousal parentage doctrine be ause in both ettings the fact of maniage
pr mpts consequences involving constitutional losses. 304 Marriage
b·iggers either spousal support or child support; yet, a pousal parent can
avoid child support by overcoming (as by rebutting) pousal parentage
through evidence of no genetic tie , or no earlier assisted reproduction
pact. 305 De facto parentage where successfully pursued on behalf of an
alleged de facto parent due to a developed ·parental-like relationship,
cannot be so ea ily overcome by an objecting, exi ting legal parent who
must now share, if not lose, 306 child custody interests though they were
Jd.
See cases cited and discussion supra Section II A.
ioo
Compare cases cited and discussion supra Section II A, with cases cited and
discussion supra Section II F-H.
JOI
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS§ 16 cmt.
d, illus. 11 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019).
io2
See discussion supra Section II F-H.
303
See sources cited supra notes 29-39 (discussing presumed consent in intentional
tort cases).
104
Compare Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 219 224 (Wis. 1980)
(recognizing "a legally necessary item''), with Condore v. Prince George' Cty., 425 A.2d
1011, 1019 (Md. 1981) (striking down pousal necessary duty on equality grounds).
)OS
See UNlF. PAR NTAGEACT § 201 cmt. (UNll'. LAW COMM'N2017).
306
See id.§§ 609(0), 613 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017)(stating that an exi ting legal
parent, as with a spousal parent-unless there may be three parents under law-can lose
29s

29 9
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uninvolved in, or unaware of, the developing parental-like relationship of
the de facto parent.
More importantly, many of those bound under the quasi-contract
doctrine must invite, and do benefit from, performances under pacts that
are technically non-contracts. Losses of protected parentage interests, as
in Safe Haven settings, occur without any invitations, and with harms (not
benefits) to those incurring losses. 307 When the quasi-contract doctrine
prompt a separated po use' s upport for things such as neces ary clothing
and supplies, more difficult questions arise regarding justification for
innocent los ·es. Yet, here, as with child support duties for some presumed
spousal parents (e.g., those married to birth mothers at the time of
conception pregnancy, and/or birth but who are not genetic donors) there
was conduct involving an eadier marriage whose legal consequences
were or quite rea onably hould have been known. Consensual sex with
a woman who clearly indicated that child conception was impossible
would less reasonably prompt one to think about future innocent lo es of
parentage interests through de facto parentage in a third party, or through
a unilateral Safe Haven placement.
Lawyer agency in criminal and civil cases can prompt client losses
of constitutional rights, which are innocent where the client did not agree
to or pecifically authorize the lawyer to act in the particular way. 30 Yet
here one (the lawyer) prompting innocent losses by another (the client)
was acting a an agent while typically employing expertise not held by
the other, and attempting to act in tactical" ways to benefit the otber. 309
By contrast in de facto parent formal adoption and Safe Raven settings,
parental interests can be innocently lost by an ex_isting or expecting legal
parent who wa unaware of, and did not invite or desire, a new parent in
the child' life, and who did not delegate to another existing or expecting
legal parent the authority to prompt a new par ntage. 3 10

N.

CONCLUSION

Innocent losses of constitutional rights arise when the rightsholders
have not acted in any way to prompt the losses, as by direct or implicit
per onal waivers, in apparent ways, or through agents. Courts, legislators,
parental interests in order to recognize parentage of another person who is petitioning to be a
de facto parent).
307
See discussion supra Section II F.
30 8
See discussion supra Section II D-E.
309
See id.
3 1o
See discussion supra Section II F-H.
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and commentators have sanctioned such innocent losses in varying
settings, including the "common authority" doctrine in Fourth
Amendment search cases; the "presumed consent" doctrine in intentional
tort cases; the quasi-contract doctrine in property cases; lawyer agency
doctrines in court procedure cases; and, childcare cases involving de facto
parentage, formal adoptions, and Safe Havens. 311
The rationales for such innocent losses are weak, especially when
fundamental rights are lost. Innocent losses of constitutional rights must
be mitigated. Generally, losses of constitutional rights should be limited
to settings where the rightsholders themselves acted in some way, whether
directly, indirectly, apparently, or through agents.

311

See discussion supra Part II.
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